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Comment
Towards artisanal fishing zones
The struggle by artisanal fishers in Peru has been in the news of late. They are
demanding that the integrity of the five-mile artisanal fishing zone be maintained, in the
face of recent moves to open up ‘windows of penetration’ to allow large-scale industrial
fishing in the southern part of the country (see The Holy Grail, pg. 21). 
Starting in the 1970s, several countries around the world have established artisanal
fishing zones. In many cases, the declaration of such zones was a response by States
to the growing conflicts between the large-scale and the artisanal sectors, as in India
and Indonesia. Faced with increasing and unequal competition from the technologically
efficient large-scale sector, artisanal fishworkers in many countries expressly
demanded the establishment of these zones. 
That such zones can play an important role from a social perspective is undeniable.
Millions of people in the developing world depend on fisheries for a livelihood, and a
majority of them fish in coastal and nearshore waters. Their livelihoods, as well as the
fisheries resource base, are known to be directly and indirectly jeopardized by the
activities of industrial and large-scale fleets using destructive gear, such as bottom
trawls, in coastal waters. 
From a fisheries management perspective too, the logic for the establishment of
artisanal zones, where only selective fishing gear and techniques are permitted, is
incontestable. Coastal and inter-tidal areas are known to be highly fragile, productive
and important as spawning and breeding grounds.  As such, a regulation that allows
only selective and responsible fishing in such zones, in combination with other
management measures, could be very effective. 
These issues are to be discussed at a workshop that the International Collective in
Support of Fishworkers (ICSF) is organizing early next year, titled Sustaining Fisheries
and Livelihoods in Latin America: The Imperative of Secure Access Rights for Artisanal
Fishworkers. 
In deciding on measures that could support the small-scale and artisanal sector, the
changing context and the dynamism within this sector must also be kept in mind. It
would be inappropriate to see the artisanal zone as a ‘box within which the small-scale
sector is confined. The small-scale sector, in many parts of the world, as in the
Philippines, Senegal, India, Sri Lnaka, Peru and Chile, has convincingly demonstrated
its ability to harvest highly migratory resources, such as tuna and shark, in a sustainable
manner, in deeper waters within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs). To the extent
that small-scale fisheries for such species is technologically and environmentally
efficient, and leads to socially desirable outcomes such as greater employment and
equitable distribution of income, it must be supported through specific policy measures.
Recognizing the artisanal zone is an important first step towards recognizing and
supporting the artisanal and small-scale sector. The struggles of artisanal and
small-scale fishworkers for maintaining the integrity of the artisanal zone, as in Peru,
cannot but be backed. By demonstrating enough political will, States can design and
implement fisheries management measures that meet the goals of both equity and
sustainability. 
COMMENT
SAMUDRA Report No. 39 November 2004 1
Food security
Wild food from sea and forest
There are some parallels between overfishing and the bushmeat 
crisis in west Africa, especially in terms of livelihoods and food security
Most readers will be well versedwith the crisis affecting theworld’s fisheries, and the role of
the United Nations (UN) in addressing the
resultant problems. But they may not
know that the UN has also warned of an
impending ‘bushmeat crisis’, which
threatens both the food security of forest
communities and the survival of the
species hunted. The high level of hunting
in the tropics for bushmeat—the meat
obtained from animals caught in the
wild—is of increasing international
concern. In significant parts of the tropics,
especially in Africa, there is now a massive
and completely unmanaged harvest of
wild meat for consumption purposes. In
these areas, the levels of offtake may well
represent a greater threat to the
sustainability of wildlife than habitat
conversion.
The London-based Overseas
Development Institute (ODI) is
implementing a project to research the
human and social dimensions of hunting
wild meat for consumption in tropical
forests. In contrast to most research
previously carried out that has focused on
the ecological and biodiversity impacts of
bushmeat hunting, the ODI project aims to
greatly expand understanding of
bushmeat as an important dimension of
livelihoods security for poor people, often
in underdeveloped States. It is anticipated
that through a better understanding of the
human and social dimensions of hunting,
new approaches to solving the bushmeat
crisis can be crafted.
This article is based on the author’s
contribution to the ODI project and his
own experience of the crises affecting both
fisheries and bushmeat. Information has
also been drawn from the ODI website
(http://www.odi-bushmeat.org/
wildlife_policy_briefs.htm ). 
The important contribution made by fish
to household food security in west Africa
is well documented. Fish is widely
consumed as a staple source of protein,
often providing the only affordable source
of this and other essential nutrients for
low-income families. Fishing also
provides livelihoods for millions of
people who catch, process, transport and
trade fish. There are also many
fishery-dependent sources of livelihoods
in such ancillary industries as
boatbuilding, net making, engine services
and repair, and so on. 
The contribution of bushmeat to food
security is less well known. There are few
well-documented case studies and
statistics. However, indications are that,
as in the case of fisheries, bushmeat does
make an important contribution to food
security at the household level—both as a
source of food and as a source of income. 
Bushmeat has long played a role in the
livelihoods of people living in tropical
forest and savannah areas. For many rural
people, bushmeat is not only an important
source of animal protein in their diets, but
it may also increasingly be a key
component of their livelihoods in
providing flexible cash incomes from its
sale to traders and local consumers. Large
proportions of communities can be
involved in hunting. For example, in
Congo’s forested areas, one study found
that approximately 50 per cent of
households earned income from
bushmeat sales. Bushmeat may be
consumed as food by a substantial
proportion of households, both close to
forest areas and elsewhere. 
Safety net
Like fisheries, bushmeat may also provide
a safety net for the poor in times of
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on for improved food security. It is also
often traded along a ‘commodity chain’,
and a range of other people, apart from
hunters and their families, may depend
on bushmeat for their livelihoods. For
example, traders who journey to areas
where bushmeat is hunted, may also be
urban market vendors (frequently,
women) who sell the dried bushmeat to
consumers. 
A further parallel with fisheries isthe distinction often drawnbetween bushmeat hunting for
subsistence and hunting that is
commercial. In reality, hunters may often
hunt simultaneously for subsistence and
commercial purposes—depending on
what species they are able to successfully
hunt on each occasion. Large, high-value
species may be sold, while smaller species
may be kept for household consumption.
While studies on the harvesting of
bushmeat tend to highlight the use of
endangered species such as gorillas,
much bushmeat is from small, common
mammals and birds, some of which are
crop pests. Also, like fish, bushmeat can
be smoke-dried, enabling it to be stored
for a limited period for household use or
to enable trading over a wider area.  A
great deal of bushmeat is eaten in ‘chop
bars’, which are restaurants specializing
in dishes containing bushmeat.
Although accurate data on consumption
of bushmeat is limited, some idea of its
importance in comparison to fish and
conventional meat supplies can be seen in
Table 1.
The negative impacts of fishing activities
off west Africa on fish stocks are well
established, as are its knock-on effects
onshore, such as in the artisanal
processing and trading sectors. Similarly,
bushmeat harvesting is known to have
had a considerable impact on the
populations of some animals.  However,
fisheries studies tend to concentrate
exclusively on fisheries matters, and
bushmeat studies, on bushmeat matters,
which tells us little about the possible
interactions. For example, there have been
many studies on the effects of overfishing
on fish stocks and on the implications of
overharvesting of some mammals for
bushmeat on their conservation status,
but studies that look at the wider impacts
are relatively scarce. Even the impact of
overfishing on the wider issue of food
security in west Africa, and the influence
of fish supply on the demand for
competing proteins are underexamined.
So, when a link was proposed between
overfishing by European Union (EU)
vessels and increased demand for
bushmeat, one of the big problems was to
find evidence.
Food security
Since fish and bushmeat are so important
in food security, it may be reasonable to







Table 1:  The relative importance of fish and bushmeat 
in west African food supply
Country Bushmeat supply
1 Meat supply2 Fish supply2
Cameroon 233 963 225 000 125 000
Central African Republic 48 821 96 000 15 000
Congo DR1 665 972 238 000 298 000
Rep .Congo 189 234 45 000 50 000
Equatorial Guinea1 2 937 n/a 7 007
Gabon 49 069 55 122 59 405
  All data in tonnes per annum.  
Supply=Total Production + Imports - Exports
     1 Source: Fa et al. 2003
     2 Source: FAOSTAT http://apps.fao.org/  Taken from food balance
 and fisheries databases for 2001 
  n/a Not available
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one will have an influence on the demand
for the other. But how might such a
mechanism operate and what might be
the causes of reduced supply, in the first
place?
Overfishing and its impacts arewell documented in west Africa.Artisanal fishing plays a major
role in the region, both in supplying
low-cost fish (often small pelagic species)
to local markets, and catching
higher-value demersal species for export.
With stocks in decline, competition with
larger-scale fleets—both national and
foreign—for fishing space, resources and
markets (local and export) has intensified.
Also, as the artisanal catch is increasingly
providing fish for exports, availability of
fish for local consumers may be further
reduced. 
Both small-scale and large-scale fishing
activities have been implicated in
overfishing and stock depletion. But the
lion’s share of the blame often goes to
foreign fleets. These are reported to take
more than 60 per cent of the west African
fish catch. The EU fleet, in particular,
operating under fishing licence
agreements (FLAs) and other
arrangements, has come in for criticism
for exceeding quotas, and illegal fishing;
but proving this is quite another thing.
Vessels fishing under FLAs may even make
a positive contribution to food security by
landing by-catch or marketing their catch
of small pelagics locally. 
In fact, the west African countries are
major importers of small pelagic species
from the EU. In both value and volume
terms, the import is considerable, with
annual amounts reaching several
hundred thousand tonnes. A significant
part of this is caught in west African
waters by EU supertrawlers.
Unfortunately, the actual catch data for
any distant-water fleet (DWF) fishing in
west African waters is subject to
speculation.  Whether it is by the artisanal
fishers who may migrate up and down the
coast or by industrial fleets fishing under
FLAs or other arrangements (joint
ventures, chartering, and so on), accurate,
verified catch data is hard to come by. In
the case of artisanal fishers, who tend to
land their catches in remote and isolated
locations, trying to keep a tally is near
impossible.  In the case of some DWF,
much doubt has been expressed as to
whether their declared catches in any way
reflect the actual catch.  In the worst
case—that of illegal fishing by vessels
operating under flags of
convenience—we have almost no idea of
what they are actually catching, or where
they are catching it.
It is often convenient to blame EU vessels
for the worst excesses of DWF, but this may
not be justified. Undoubtedly, the EU fleet
has contributed to the decrease in fish
stocks off west Africa, but for all their
faults, at least there is some degree of
transparency in what they do, even if
reported catches are sometimes treated
with some scepticism.  As far as bushmeat
is concerned, they may even do some
good, as fish caught by EU vessels off west
Africa contributes some 700,000 tonnes
per annum to supplies in central Africa. Of
course, it can be argued that it would be
better, for many reasons, if this were to be
supplied by the coastal States’ fishing
fleets.
Taking the Gulf of Guinea as an example,
EU FLAs account for a relatively small
proportion of the reported catch. While
they target demersal fishes, cephalopods
and crustaceans, which are not consumed
widely in west Africa due to their high
cost, large quantities of fish of low
economic value are caught as by-catch.
The impact of this remains unmeasured,
although it is reported that an ever-greater
proportion of this is supplied to local
markets, both directly and indirectly. On
the other hand, west African States make
large catches of pelagics to supply the
local market. But the relative impact and
significance of these activities, and those
undertaken by the EU supertrawler fleet,
on the key pelagic stocks, are unknown. 
Pirate fishing
What really throws the whole issue into
confusion is the problem of pirate fishing
by unregulated vessels fishing under flags
of convenience. These are the real
unknowns in the equation as, by their very
nature, they do not report catches, so it is
very difficult to assess their impact on fish
stocks and food security. A recent report
by Greenpeace highlighted the problem of
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is beyond doubt is that some fish stocks
in the Gulf of Guinea have been fished
beyond the point of sustainability, but
quite who is to blame is difficult to say.
The effect that overfishing has onfood security and, moreimportantly, the paths through
which it acts are not well known beyond
the fisheries sector. We have information
on the impact of overfishing on the
supply of fish to artisanal processors and
to petty traders, but not much
information on the subsequent wider
impact on food security. What will fishers
do if there is not enough fish to be caught?
If artisanal fish processors do not have
enough fish, or fish is too expensive, what
alternative incomes might be available?
Last, but not least, if consumers cannot
find fish in the markets, or it is too
expensive, what alternative food sources
might they turn to? There is no single
answer to this question, as food
preferences vary so much even within a
single country, let alone in the region.
When people go to buy food, they may go
out with something specific in mind or
they may go out just to see what is
available before making a choice. There
will be times when only bushmeat will
do, and there will be times when only fish
will do—or, indeed, chicken, goat, beef or
beans. The trouble is we just do not have
enough information about why
consumers choose a particular food on
each occasion. We can suppose that
availability, price and quality are all
important in determining choice, but
quite how, and how important each of
them is, is very poorly known. Even with
this lack of knowledge, it is quite
reasonable to suppose that if fish is not
available or is too expensive, consumers
will turn to another protein source
instead.
Evidence for this is scarce, but it is
currently being researched in Nigeria and
Ghana, so we should get some idea of the
interaction and competition between
various protein sources in due course.
The main interaction is likely to be in the
marketplace. It is very common to see
dried, smoked marine fish for sale in
remote, inland markets, alongside
bushmeat. Improving infrastructure in
west Africa now means that frozen fish is
now more widely available, and this too
may be trucked inland to areas where fish
supplies have previously been limited. In
this case, it might be that improving fish
supplies inland could have a beneficial
effect on bushmeat animals by providing
an alternative, readily available protein
source. That of course, all depends on why
consumers choose fish, bushmeat or other
meats and until we know that, we cannot
be sure what interactions there might be
between fish supply and bushmeat
demand. However, it seems inconceivable
that there is no interaction or competition
between two such important protein
sources, but how it works is very much
open to question.
Studies in Ghana have shown a strong
relationship over time between per capita
fish supply and bushmeat species
biomass. In years when per capita fish
supply was low, bushmeat species
biomass also tended to be low, suggesting
increased offtake. Further, it was also
noted that bushmeat supplies in some
markets tended to be higher when fish
supply was limited.  It would be wrong to
suggest a direct cause-and-effect between
the two, but it does at least indicate that a
relationship does exist, even if fish supply
and bushmeat demand are both
responding to some other factor.
There is also data indicating that in years
when the fish stocks in the Gulf of Guinea
are low, bushmeat offtake tends to
increase. This may not be a simple
supply-related effect, with bushmeat
replacing fish as it appears to be due, at
least in part, to the reduced employment
opportunities available in the fisheries
catching and post-harvest sectors in years
when fish stocks are low. If they cannot
obtain work in the fisheries industry,
fishworkers seem to turn to bushmeat
harvesting and trading as an alternative
source of livelihood. It has also been
reported that there is an increasing
tendency to rear bushmeat animals at the
household level  both for food and
income.
Fishing agreements
It has been suggested that one solution to
overfishing in west Africa is to repatriate
all EU fishing vessels and to cancel all
fishing agreements with the EU. But this
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facing west African fisheries, let alone to
contribute to bushmeat conservation. One
problem is that removal of EU fishing
effort would not necessarily reduce the
overall fishing effort. 
Under the United NationsConvention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS), there is a requirement
for coastal States to make any surplus
stocks available to other nations. So
fishing opportunities provided by the EU
fleets’ departure might simply be
reallocated to others.  If these were west
African fleets, it could have a beneficial
effect on regional food security and might
generate greater economic activity than
catches removed from the region by DWF,
assuming the catches were not simply
diverted to exports. Given that the
demand for export markets remains high,
it is very likely that fishing agreements
would be replaced by joint ventures or
other agreements designed to ensure
continued supply for importing countries.
If the fishing opportunities were
reallocated to other, less accountable DWF,
the effect could be detrimental for the
region.
Of these options, the one that may have
the greatest benefit for bushmeat animal
conservation is for coastal States to use as
much of their fishing opportunities
themselves as possible, with the fish being
landed and traded regionally. If
infrastructure continues to develop in
west Africa, then it can be expected that
fish will continue to find new markets in
remote inland areas, and that supplies to
these markets will continue to increase.
Whether this would help ease demand for
bushmeat remains to be seen, but it might
well be that those with an interest in
bushmeat conservation might do well to
look to the seas as well as the forest. As to
the question of what role other meats such
as frozen chicken might play, that is an
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ITQs
Fishing for a pension or peanuts? 
Individual transferable quotas favour armchair fishers, 
not active fishermen, in the halibut fishery of British Columbia 
The west coast halibut fishery ofNorth America has a long historyof regulation. Under the auspices
of the International Pacific Halibut
Commission, from its southern limits in
California to its northern bounds in
Alaska, the fishery has been regulated
and researched since 1923. 
However, the management of the
‘derby-style’ fishery came under scrutiny
in British Columbia (BC), Canada, during
the late 1980s. Open for very brief periods
(six days in 1990), the fishery operated
with no quota or gear restrictions, and
stayed open until the total allowable
catch (TAC) was reached. 
The ‘race for fish’ during these brief
fisheries seasons raised many questions,
particularly with regard to safety,
efficiency and sustainability. In 1991, the
Canadian Department of Fisheries and
Oceans (DFO) initiated a  programmme
for quota-based management of the
fishery. After the first two years, the
quotas became transferable. The creation
and implementation of an individual
transferable quota (ITQ)  programmme in
the halibut fishery of BC by the DFO was
subsequently analyzed by two papers
published in 1995: “The Effects of
Individual Vessel Quotas in the British
Columbia Halibut Fishery,” by Keith
Casey et.al. Marine Resource Economics 10:
211-230; and “Canada’s Pacific Halibut
Fishery: A Case Study of an Individual
Quota Fishery,” by Bruce Turris in
Limiting Access to Marine Fisheries: Keeping
the Focus on Conservation. Karen Gimbel
ed. Center for Marine Conservation,
Washington DC.
These two studies characterized the
transformation of the derby-style fishery
to a quota-based harvest as a success
story, and focused on the positive
implications for fishery management.
These analyses were made, however,
before the development of the current
system of transferability within the
fishery. Transferability was prohibited
during the first two years of the pilot
programme (1991 and 1992), and was
limited during the next several years by a
block-system (see below). The system of
quota leasing that currently dominates the
fishery has resulted in several negative
impacts, especially to younger fishers and
those who were allocated relatively small
quotas in 1991. There are also indications
of negative ecological impacts to stocks
caught as by-catch in the halibut fishery. 
This article seeks to update the findings of
the two reports and to indicate the impacts
of transferability within this quota-based
fishery. The data is drawn from DFO
statistics on the halibut fishery, and three
years of ethnographic fieldwork with
halibut fishers in Prince Rupert, BC. 
The pre-quota fishery has been
characterized as “unsafe, overcapitalized,
wasteful and difficult to manage”. In 1990
the BC halibut fishery lasted a total of six
days, compared to a 60-day season in 1982.
Since licence limitation in 1979 (to 435
vessels), fishing capacity had been
steadily increased by larger crews,
electronic gear, circle hooks and
automatic baiters. 
Low prices
The ‘derby’ fishery of the 1980s was
described as “frantic”, resulting in lost
gear and lost lives. The majority of the fish
was frozen upon delivery, and ex-vessel
prices were relatively low (1988-1990 BC
average ex-vessel price was Can$1.72/lb).
The TAC for halibut was exceeded in eight
of the 10 years of fishing in the 1980s. It has
been suggested that the DFO was
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species during the halibut
openings—rockfish were discarded to
save room in the fish-hold for halibut. 
However, rockfish were notdiscarded by all boats during thederby fishery, and the current
restrictions on rockfish landings do result
in the discarding of rockfish by-catch
during the halibut fishery.
A 1989 survey of vessel owners suggested
that 77 per cent of the respondents (which
represented 82 per cent of licence owners)
were interested in discussing the potential
of quota-based management for the
halibut fishery. The final proposal for
quota-based management was supported
by 70 per cent of vessel owners and
opposed by the Deep Sea Fishermen’s
Union (crew union) and large processing
companies.
The halibut TAC for BC was divided
between the 435 licensed vessels, 70 per
cent based on their best annual catch in the
years between 1986 and 1989 and 30 per
cent based on vessel length. The season
was lengthened to eight months, during
which the vessels could fish at any time.  
The harvest of each vessel was validated
by dockside counts, which the fishers paid
for through a per-pound levy. The fishery
became the only one in North America
where the costs of management were
totally recovered from participants. There
was no transferability for the first two
years. After two years, temporary and
permanent transfers began. 
The longer season spread out deliveries
and resulted in 94 per cent of the harvest
arriving at the market fresh. This
reportedly increased ex-vessel prices by
55 per cent in the first two years of the
programme. The shift to a fresh product
allowed smaller processing firms to
increase their involvement in halibut
processing, as the capital requirements of
participation were drastically reduced.
The percentage of Canadian fish landed at
US ports decreased. 
The longer season also allowed fishers to
avoid bad weather, and fish at a reduced
pace, presumably increasing the safety of
the fishery. The DFO was satisfied that
discarding was not a major problem and
that reductions in lost gear resulted in
lower mortality rates through ‘ghost
fishing’.
Transferable quota
A survey of licence holders in early 1994
received 135 responses (31 per cent).
During the first year of transferability, 70
per cent had fished their entire quota in
1993, 17 per cent fished their own and
leased more, eight per cent had leased out
all of their quota, and five per cent had
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It was also found that 44 per cent ofvessels reduced their crew during thetwo years after quota, reducing crew
employment by 32 per cent. Eighteen per
cent  of this was attributed to crew size
reductions, and 14 per cent to crew
displacement from non-active vessels. At
the time, 59 per cent of crew shares
increased on vessels operating with fewer
crew. Shifts in the arrangement of shares
to accommodate the value now inherent
in quota itself have also been noted in the
two 1995 reports referred to above.
While crew employment decreased by 25
per cent in the first year of the
programme, it has been suggested that
the total number of man-hours in the
fishery has increased. However, this
cannot be understood as a positive shift,
as halibut crew do not receive an hourly
wage. In fact, this suggests a further
deterioration of crew income. 
At the time of the licence holder survey,
transferability was limited by a block
system. The initial allocation was divided
into two equal shares. Two could be
leased out, or two additional leased to
harvest. There were 74 licensed vessels no
longer participating in the fishery. Those
vessels with larger allocations were more
likely to lease additional quota,
suggesting a movement towards
consolidation. 
The changes in the halibut fishery have
been described as positive by one source.
But this was based on a survey that was
both extremely early in the development
of the new fishery, and only dealt with the
attitudes of vessel owners to the
regulatory shift. It did not take into
account the experiences of crew,
remaining and displaced, and was unable
to anticipate the extremely significant
impact of the quota leasing arrangements
that have come to dominate the fishery. 
In the years subsequent to this early
survey, some of the limits on
transferability were lifted. Quota
transfers between boats can be of any size,
and reflect any percentage of the total
allocation, and are not limited in number.
The maximum amount of the TAC that can
be held by, or fished by, any license is one
per cent. At a TAC that floats around the
10 mn lbs mark, as it has for the BC halibut
fishery for the past several years, a full
‘tab’ of halibut is in the vicinity of 100,000
lbs. 
The lifting of the transferability limits has
resulted in considerable changes to
fishery participation rates. The number of
active vessels has decreased considerably
during the decade since quota
transferability was implemented. In 2002,
there were only 214 active licences, out of
the 435 licensed vessels, that made halibut
landings, with 221 licence owners leasing
out their quota to another vessel.
Compared to 196 in 1998, 422 licences
were involved in quota transfers, with
approximately 65 per cent of the TAC
involved in temporary transfers. While
the DFO statistics do not allow for accurate
isolation of the lessee/lessor ratios, it
appears that there are approximately
equal numbers of licences leasing out and
leasing in. 
The quota leasing structure negatively
impacts lessee vessel owners, and almost
all crew on halibut vessels. Halibut quota
is usually leased for a specific price per
pound before the fish is harvested, with
the processing company acting as a
middleman and financier. Active fishers
lease various units of quota (up to one per
cent of the TAC), and quota owners are
usually paid upfront by the fishing
company. The cumulative lease prices
then become a debt of the active fisher to
the processing company, obligating them
to sell their harvest to that company.
When an active vessel delivers halibut, the
lease price is deducted from the ex-vessel
price of the fish, in addition to the
management fees that are part of the
mandatory enforcement and validation
system. Whatever is left over is the true
price paid to the skipper and crew for their
labour and risk.
Averaged example for 2002 halibut
season, derived from interviews with
halibut fishers.
Ex-vessel price /lb Can$3.83
Quota lease price /lb Can$2.35
Management fees /lb Can$0.28
                                      
Can$1.20/lb balance for expenses, 
crew and boat shares
This examples shows that in 2002 the
return to those involved in harvesting the
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amount paid to the ‘armchair’ fisherman
who was allocated quota in 1991 or bought
quota in the succeeding years. 
The per-pound lease price forhalibut quota fluctuates dependingon a number of factors, but it is
difficult to identify a determining factor,
with individual fishers explaining the
price relationship differently. Lease prices
are tied to quota purchases prices, and to
ex-vessel prices, which are, in turn, related
to purchase prices, resulting in reciprocal
and circular relationships. The following
factors appear to influence, or have
influenced, lease prices at different
moments during the period of
transferability:
1. The lease price appears to be tied to
ex-vessel prices for halibut, and has
a reciprocal relationship with the
per-pound purchase price for
halibut quota. Higher ex-vessel
prices can raise the price of halibut
leases during any given fishing
season. The purchase price of quota
is increased by rising lease prices,
but can also influence pre-season
lease prices based on a percentage
relationship between quota price
and lease price (see point 3).
2. Some quota investors seek a 10 per
cent return on their investment. A
quota-owner who paid Can$25/lb
for quota often wants to see a
Can$2.50/lb lease price for his fish.
This 10 per cent return reflects the
way in which quota has come to be
understood as an investment,
similar to playing the stockmarket.
3. There appears to be a control factor
on the lease prices that leaves a
target of Can$1.00/lb available to
the lessee for expenses, crew and
boat share. This is an arbitrary
amount that has developed as a
baseline ‘wage’. 
4. The upfront financing of halibut
quota leases by the processing
companies has had an inflationary
effect on the lease price. The
companies’ ability to pay lease
prices before the opening of the
halibut season has weakened the
relationship between ex-vessel
price and lease price. Furthermore,
the competition between
companies for access to halibut
landings encourages the
companies to pay high lease prices
in order guarantee that fish will be
sold to them. This cost is then
transferred to lessee fishers. 
Standard price
During the first few years after the
introduction of individual vessel-based
quotas (IVQs), the size-based price split in
ex-vessel halibut prices was not common.
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standard price for all sizes of halibut.
However, the price differential for three
size categories of halibut has become
standard once more. Halibut are graded
by size: up to 40 lbs, 40-60 lbs, and 60 lbs
plus, with the larger fish being worth
more. The price differential can reach 40
cents per lb.
The quota leasing system generallyencourages the active fishermen toachieve the highest prices and
profit margin possible, by conducting
longer trips, and catching large fish that
will receive the greatest price. However,
there is very little indication of
high-grading for size in the fishery due to
the effort required to catch the fish, time
restrictions due to other fisheries (that is,
salmon), and weather concerns. 
However, the Can$1/lb target tends to
impact on the price and pay structure
during periods of high ex-vessel prices.
The 2003 season saw extremely high
ex-vessel prices for halibut, reaching
above the Can$5 mark. Some quota
owners put their quota on the market at a
fixed price per pound for the lessee,
rather than at a fixed lease price. This
fixed crew remuneration at relatively low
levels, whilst allowing for windfall
profits for the quota owners. 
For example, a Prince Rupert fisherman
fished halibut quota for Can$1.10/lb,
which left the increasing value from high
ex-vessel prices available to the quota
owner. While this has not become the
standard agreement, it suggests the
potential for a shift towards fishing for
wages. Some quota owners who structure
their agreements this way stipulate that
the quota be fished during the autumn
months when the prices are relatively
higher. This can force lessees to fish in
more inclement weather, reducing the
assumed safety impacts of quota-based
management. 
Price differentials and ‘inverted’ lease
agreements (based on a fixed per lb rate)
encourage some quota owners to refrain
from leasing their quota out during the
early part of the season, leading to lease
price speculation. Owners can speculate
on different ex-vessel prices throughout
the season, and on the lease prices paid by
various companies. 
The competition between processing
companies for access to halibut has
increased the power of the quota owners
to set lease prices. Processing companies,
acting as the middlemen for most leasing
agreements, may acquiesce to high lease
prices to secure access to halibut. 
Low value
Crew shares have generally been reduced
to less than 10 per cent of the after-lease
value of the fish, which can be as low as
three per cent of the ex-vessel price of the
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whether fishing owned or leased quotas.
Previously, approximately 10 per cent of
the ex-vessel price was more or less the
crew-share norm, depending on the share
agreements and crew size. 
During the second half of the 1990s,most quota owners started tolease their quota to themselves,
thereby removing a lease price from the
gross earnings on owned quota. Crew on
many boats, regardless of the relative
percentages of owned or leased quota
fished by the vessels, receive a crew share
drawn from less than a dollar per pound.
Thus many crew appear to be no better off
if they fish on a boat with a large owned
allocation of quota or on a boat for which
the majority of the quota is leased. Family
operations and vessels with long-term
and steady crew provide the exception to
this general tendency. 
During the first two years of the ITQ
programme, the value of halibut licences
reportedly nearly doubled. More
significantly, the purchase price of halibut
quota has risen dramatically due to the
steady income provided by leasing quota.
Retired fishers can lease their quota
holdings in perpetuity, often making
more per pound leasing out their quota
than they were paid for halibut in the late
1980s and early 1990s. In fact, the leasing
system has encouraged many fishers to
stay at home, as many suggest that the
return for their labour, their risk, the wear
on their boat and so on is not worthwhile.
Leasing out their quota makes more
economic sense than fishing it themselves.
The leasing option also encourages older
fishers to transfer their other fishing
investments into halibut quota. Fishers
nearing retirement might sell a salmon
licence and buy halibut quota, reflecting
the leasing option and the current tax
restrictions on liquidation of fishing
assets. Fishers can sell another licence and
buy halibut quota without a tax impact,
whereas selling out of the fishing industry
completely involves considerable tax
losses. Halibut quota thus has become a
retirement savings plan for older fishers.
There is little economic incentive to sell
their holdings to younger fishers. 
Quota allocations and the leasing system
have created a significant generation gap
in the fishing industry. Those who were
fishing in 1991 received allocations based
on previous participation in the fishery.
The price of halibut quota has risen from
0 in 1991, to highs of Can$35/lb in 2004.
The estimation of the increased value of
the initial windfall allocations is difficult
as individual quotas fluctuate with the
annual TAC, as they are a percentage of
that total. The 1991 allocations, ranged
from 4,000 lbs to 70,000 lbs, created a mean
of 33,000 lbs. This mean allocation would
now be worth Can$1,155,000, at a
Can$35/lb quota price. At a current lease
price of Can$2.80/lb, this quota could
provide the owner with an annual income
of Can$92,400. 
Younger fishers, who were not
participating in the fishery prior to 1991
must lease or purchase quota to fish, at
these high prices. They thus face
significantly higher debt-loads than
previous generations of fishers. In order to
own the means of production, they must
not only purchase a vessel and gear, but
also make even larger investments in
licences and quota. Their ability to
purchase quota is limited by the refusal of
banks and other lending institutions to
accept quota or licences as collateral.
Generally, fishers can only borrow against
the value of their vessel. Fishers who
received an initial allocation in 1991 are
better able to purchase quota and increase
their holdings than younger fishers are
able to buy into the fishery. Consolidation
of quota ownership is an increasing
concern. 
The shift to quota-based management has
resulted in some very positive changes in
the BC halibut fishery including a longer
season, ease of enforcement, catches
below the TAC, and higher ex-vessel prices
due to the shift to a fresh market.
However, these gains might have been
effected through other management tools
rather than individual quotas. 
Interviews with crew and young vessel
owners in the BC halibut fishery suggest
that the system of transferability has
resulted in significant negative impacts to
these groups. 
Increased value
Fishers who were allocated quota in 1991
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increase substantially. The current
system allows them to lease their quota
for more than 50 per cent of the ex-vessel
price of the fish. The system has resulted
in high levels of quota owner control of
lease prices, incentives not to fish, and not
to sell their quota. 
Participation in the fishery hasdropped to approximately 50 percent, with half the fleet leasing their
quota out and becoming ‘armchair
fishermen’. Crew employment and crew
wages have been significantly reduced
both by decreased rates of vessel
participation, and by the leasing
structure. 
Vessel owners who were not allocated
quota in 1991 must lease or buy quota in
order to participate in the fishery. Many
complain that the returns from fishing
leased quota are so low that they cannot
afford to invest in halibut quota. Thus,
those who lease quota cannot easily
accumulate enough capital to purchase
the means of production, thereby
perpetuating the leasing system. With the
inversion of the lease structure, from flat
rates for the lessor to flat rates for the
lessee, during periods of high ex-vessel
prices for halibut, there is a suggestion of
shift towards something closer to a wage
structure. 
Thus, the benefits of IVQs to fishers have
been concentrated on the 435 licence
owners who participated in the fishery
during the shift to quota-based
management and who benefited from the
initial allocations. Crew members and
subsequent generations have been
impacted negatively by the shift and the
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Jellyfish exports
Bloom or bust?
Jellyfish is a new fish export industry in the south Indian 
State of Tamil Nadu, with effects on local fishing communities
Rumours of the destroyed huts wererife in the air as the businessmenhustled all morning, frantic to
negotiate and strike a deal with village
leaders in an attempt to stop the upsurge
of violent protest against the jellyfish
industry. Some villagers were angry,
some were pleased; all were talking about
the ‘jellyfish men’ and, in the background,
a lady complained bitterly that despite
yielding an ample prawn catch that
morning, nobody was interested. 
This is a description of the scene in Pulicat,
a small fishing town at the southern
border of Pulicat Lake, Tamil Nadu, India
on 21 July 2003, the morning after
fishermen from several villages destroyed
the processing huts of the newly
established jellyfish industry. These
villages, like many throughout India, have
existed for generations in their entirety
upon the precious and fragile livelihood
of fishing. Often neither much changed by
India’s economic advance nor touched by
the political storms of the wider world, the
villages in Pulicat remain, at a glance, very
much as they have always been: colourful
arrays of houses dotted amongst coconut
palms, bordered by long rows of resting
wooden kattumarams. These traditional
boats, long surviving the modernity of
today’s fishing fleet, remain lined up on
beaches throughout the State, defiant
against the onslaught of the Bay of Bengal,
and calmly awaiting fishermen to again
embrace the perilous sea for a daily wage.
To understand the impact of the jellyfish
industry on the lives of fishermen and
their families and on the structure of
traditional fishing society, one must look
back to the industry’s arrival in the state
of Tamil Nadu, less than a year before
these disturbances occurred. The
observant visitor to the Tamil Nadu coast
may have noticed over the last year that,
amongst these familiar clusters of village
homes and temple squares, has arrived a
new type of building, which can now be
seen in almost all coastal villages from
Pondicherry in the south up to the Andhra
Pradesh border in the north and beyond.
The large open-thatched structures that
have appeared in coastal villages
throughout Tamil Nadu are not the result
of some new craze of housing style; they
are, in fact, the now empty processing
units of the rapidly spreading jellyfish
industry, lying in wait for the season to
begin again this spring.
Many have generally welcomed the
industry as a thankful alternative to their
dwindling fish and prawn catches. Others
have been angered that, for numerous
reasons, they have been unable to benefit
from the new export and also by the
pollution that processing units have
sometimes been under suspicion of
causing in local surroundings. Little is
known about the jellyfish industry,
although what can be sure is that the
industry stirs up a storm of its own within
communities and between villages, as
trade agreements are set up, and
seaworthy boat sales soar as access to the
jellyfish becomes everyone’s first priority.
Perhaps the questions the fishermen must
ask are “How can I benefit from the
trade?” and, more importantly, “Is this
new industry sustainable?”, before
rushing out to acquire a new boat and the
subsequent debts. 
Major export
According to Tamil fishermen, the
summer of 2003 was the first time that the
jellyfish industry significantly hit Tamil
Nadu. Major export industries, based
predominantly in the far east, with outlets
in Pondicherry and Chennai, started the
impressively quick and extensive
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fishermen and even entire fishing villages
in the haste to make profit from last year’s
particularly large jellyfish swarms. The
mass exodus of fishermen to benefit from
this trade meant that, in some areas, the
jellyfish export trade usurped even
prawn exports, and became the number
one exportable product for several
months. 
The industry did not only providealternative income throughbuying jellyfish, but also through
developing onsite jellyfish processing
units, required due to the highly
perishable nature of jellyfish, which
needs treatment within only a few hours
of capture. Jellyfish are landed directly at
the processing huts, and immediately
dehydrated using a traditional step-wise
reduction of water content with a 10 per
cent salt-and-alum mix, although, in
some instances, more potent chemicals
are involved, including bleach products,
used to whiten the jellyfish and, in doing
so, increasing its commercial value. This
operation is low-cost, requiring little
capital, but it is labour-intensive, and thus
provides welcome extra income to
workers in the processing huts, who are
usually locally employed men and
women. 
In the case of Pulicat, discontent grew
further over concerns about the potential
for pollution from the jellyfish processing
huts, creating a good case for village
feuding, in an already fragile social and
ecological environment. 
This article attempts to answer some of the
questions demanded by the upsurge of
this new export interest in Tamil Nadu
and India, by removing, in part, some of
the mystery behind the jellyfish export
industry. To begin, the global perspective
of the industry is tackled: Will we all be
eating jellyfish in the years to come, as fish
becomes a rare delicacy, and if so, what do
we understand about the jellyfish
industry in terms of longer-term
sustainability? 
Fishing for edible jellyfish has been
operational in countries like China and
Japan for many centuries, providing a
traditional and important component of
Far Eastern cuisine, and even has its
mention in writings from the Tsin
Dynasty 300 AD. In spite of this, edible
jellyfish became an important export
commodity in Southeast Asia only in the
1970s, largely as a direct result of
increased demand from the Japanese
market. 
Falling production
In the Japanese jellyfish industry, falling
domestic production has been
increasingly unable to meet rising
consumer demand, partially fuelled by
the introduction of shredded RTU
(ready-to-use) jellyfish products. Such
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but lengthy procedure of desalting
jellyfish before cooking, a requirement
that, for many, was inappropriate for
today’s modern busy lifestyle. 
The jellyfish industry began itsexpansion to Southeast Asiancountries such as Thailand,
Indonesia and Malaysia, not only due to
changes in demand and supply, but also
due to the instability of production and
price rises in the 1970s in China, Japan’s
main and traditional exporter. The result
is that today, Japan’s import market for
jellyfish alone is valued at US$ 25.5 mn per
annum. 
The main global capture production of
jellyfish (in metric tonnes as recorded by
the FAO Fisheries Department Statistics
and Monitoring since 1995), is dominated
by the northwest Pacific (Area C-61), and
seconded by the West- Central Pacific
(C-71). Captures in the Eastern Indian
Ocean, which includes the Bay of Bengal,
in comparison, are small. The only other
notable jellyfish capture is in the
Mediterranean and Black Sea, which
harvest small amounts annually. 
The interaction of jellyfish with existing
fish species within an ecosystem can be
quite complex, and determined by many
factors. Jellyfish can be detrimental to fish
populations in two ways: firstly, by those
species of jellyfish that directly predate on
fish eggs and larvae; and, secondly, by
those species that act in competition with
other predatory fish for this food source,
bearing in mind that usually the top
predatory fish claim the highest
commercial value. 
Interactions can be positive to a fishery, in
that jellyfish can also provide a source of
food for adult and sub-adult fish. What is
interesting, in terms of maintaining the
balance of the fishery ecosystem, is the
potential impact that large numbers of
jellyfish, or ‘jellyfish blooms’ can have on
fish populations and the wider-scale
impact on a commercial fishery. 
Diets of many species of jellyfish overlap
with the diets of zooplanktivorous fish
such as anchovies, herrings and sardines.
When overfishing includes these species,
there could be significant unconsumed
zooplankton, and jellyfish populations
might expand, because of the alleviated
competition for food. 
Additionally, the commercial removal of
jellyfish predators, such as salmon,
mackerel and butterfish, could further
spur jellyfish population expansion. 
However, this outcome is less clear as
many jellyfish populations can be
controlled by predation from other
jellyfish and gelatinous species. One study
points to a more sinister outlook for what
jellyfish blooms might mean to a fishery. 
Not only may jellyfish blooms indicate
overfishing of larger top predator marine
species, but also large jellyfish
populations, once established, may
suppress fish production in a recovering
fishery, through competition and
predation on fish larvae. 
Once an ecological system has reached a
point of stability as in this case, which is
the jellyfish succeeding at the top of the
food chain, the removal of its dominance
may prove difficult, potentially
preventing the recovery of the fishery,
even if fishing effort of the fish was
reduced: “The jellyfish state might be an
alternative stable state which is difficult to
revert,” according to “Pelagic food web
configurations at different levels of
nutrient richness and their implications
for the ratio fish production: primary
production”, by V. Sommer, H. Stibor, A.
Katechakis, F. Sommer and T. Hanson,
Hydrobiologia 484 (1-3), 2002.
Distributions of jellyfish populations are
notoriously sporadic and unpredictable,
and little is known about why or when
they may occur in large numbers or
‘jellyfish blooms’. Meteorological
conditions, currents, water temperature,
salinity and predation may play a
significant role in determining the
population size. 
Seasonal life cycle
The life cycle of the jellyfish is seasonal in
most species, which creates its seasonal
appearance, although it is not yet
understood what causes a jellyfish bloom
to occur. In many areas, jellyfish can
appear and disappear with great annual
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fluctuations, some years bring much
larger populations of jellyfish than others.
As a result, the fishing season forjellyfish is often restricted to onlyseveral months per year, the
timing of which can vary with locality,
and be influenced by fishing methods,
freshwater outflow through river
systems, and calm seas. 
The typically high variation and
fluctuation in annual catch highlight the
potential instability of the fishery, and
while a mass occurrence of jellyfish can
bring in economic interests from outside,
jellyfish, on other occasions, may
suddenly disappear from fishing
grounds altogether. 
Jellyfish populations seem, in recent
years, to have become unstable or show
signs of decline in East Asian waters.
Although the reasons for this are
uncertain, pollution and overfishing are
the most likely contenders for a cause, the
effect being that Asian dealers are now
exploring new sources of jellyfish. 
The fishery for jellyfish has, until recently,
remained predominantly in Southeast
Asia, the annual catch for jellyfish for this
region between the years of 1988 and 1999
being estimated at 169,000 tonnes wet
weight, which is just over half of the
worldwide estimated catch of 321,000
tonnes over the same period. 
Jellyfish are also exported to Asia from the
US and Canada, Australia and, recently,
India, Mexico and Turkey, and a wide
scope exists for other countries and other
species to join the fishery. For example,
there is a growing interest in creating an
export market in Asia for the frequent
swarms of the edible jellyfish
Stomolophusmelea gris L. Agassiz
(cannonball jellyfish) from the US: an
investment, which has the potential to
change a species—traditionally a pest to
fishermen, which clogs up nets and
crushes the shrimp catches—into a huge
environmental and economic benefit for
the region. 
In addition to the expansion of jelly
fishing in the oceans, pond culture
technology, particularly in China, is
widespread, selling for US$0.9 / kg, where
large tent-like awnings are used to
maintain a cultivated jellyfish production
throughout the year. Although little has
been written about this technology
outside of the Far East, the fact that
cultivation of jellyfish is not only possible,
but already a well-established industry in
some countries, may provide an
alternative to dwindling global fish
stocks. 
Simple techniques
The cultivation and processing of jellyfish
are simple techniques, and cost-effective.
Could the increasing demand for jellyfish
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livelihoods of many fishermen around the
globe, struggling to make ends meet and
daily having to choose between
knowingly overfishing their stocks or
starvation? What terms could be put in
place now, before the industry is taken
over by only a few to soon become very
rich? 
One could and should perhaps askthe question: To what extent canthe average fisherman benefit
from this new industry? To answer this,
one must first gain insight into how much
they are already benefiting from the
industry, and how much are they being
exploited, simply because they lack the
knowhow.
Sadly, it is not only the fishermen who lack
sufficient knowledge about the jellyfish
industry, but also the world of academia
and even the industry itself, who do not
know nearly enough about the jellyfish to
claim whether it has or has not a future in
fisheries in global terms. “In spite of their
wide commercial availability, jellyfish
processing and utilization are not
sufficiently studied and reported in the
literature,” write P. Hsieh, F.M. Leong and
J. Rudloe in “Jellyfish as food”, 
Hydrobiologia 451 (1-3), 2001. Only little is
known about the biology and fishery of
the edible jellyfish, particularly so in
Southeast Asia, where scientific studies
cannot keep up with the rapid
development of exploitation.
Surely, the potential for the sustainable
utilization of jellyfish in the face of
dwindling fish catches, as a contributor to
global cuisine, and the substantiation of
the many claims and beliefs of the
medicinal properties of certain species,
merits further interest and study by the
fisheries community. 
Jellyfish export is an established industry
in several countries bordering the Bay of
Bengal, including Myanmar, Thailand,
Indonesia and Malaysia. In comparison to
these countries, India’s jellyfish fishery is
still small-scale, although it is an industry
that seems to be gaining momentum in
terms of its development and import
capacities.
Jellyfish blooms along the coast of Tamil
Nadu are not uncommon, and many
fishermen readily recollect how much of a
nuisance it is to have hundreds of jellyfish
entangling themselves in their nets from
year to year. Some years, however, bring
more jellyfish than others, and it is not
only the Tamil fishermen who are
inconvenienced by the jellyfish swarms. A
study by Madras University found that
the nearby atomic power station situated
at Kalpakkam has suffered reduced
production efficiency, and has, in the past,
even been forced to stop production
entirely, due to the jellyfish swarms
clogging up the sea water intake piping.
This can cost an estimated Rs. 5.5 mn
(approx. US$122,000) per day on lost
revenue. 
Although only a year’s data is not
representative enough to predict the
frequency of jellyfish blooms in this area,
during the study that took place between
January 1995 and December 1996, data
showed that peaks in the jellyfish arrivals
at the power station coincided with the
reversal of the coastal water currents
during the two monsoon seasons. These
occur in early June (the southwest
monsoon) and November (northeast
monsoon) and anecdotally coincide with
the activities of the jellyfish industry in
Tamil Nadu in 2003.
The potential for local people to become
more directly involved in the processing
and export of jellyfish is largely limited by
a lack of technological knowhow,
although the benefits from such
knowhow could be substantial. The cost
of jellyfish when processed is increased
nearly seven to eight times that of the raw
commodity, but as the local fisherman do
not have the technology to process and
they get lots of jellyfish during the season,
they cannot do processing and storing.
However, as many fishermen get
unexpected incomes, there are few
complaints. 
Extra income
One of the more alarming consequences of
the jellyfish industry’s operations is the
adaptation of traditional fishermen to
specialize in ‘jelly fishing’. For example, in
Pulicat Lake in northern Tamil Nadu, the
traditional lake fishermen are naturally
keen to also ‘have a go’ at jelly fishing to
earn the substantial extra income they
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neighbours collecting on a daily basis. As
a result, many fishermen are buying the
expensive fibreglass boats that are
necessary to venture into the sea. The
traditional marine fishing villages are, of
course, not at all happy about this, and the
ability to repay the debts incurred by
fishermen as a result of buying new boats
is heavily dependent upon the
continuation of the jellyfish industry in
that area for several years at least. 
If, however, the jellyfish industry leaves
the area in a couple of years time, to
follow periodic jelly blooms in other parts
of the ocean, what fate awaits the lake
fishermen, who are left with marine
fishing boats, but no jellyfish market?
Perhaps the lake fishermen will continue
to fish in the ocean, but this transfer will
not be straightforward; new nets and
expertise would be needed. While, in the
past, traditional disputes between
villages at Pulicat have occurred over
fishing rights in the lake, could it be that
the jellyfish industry has shifted things so
that future disputes may be over who can
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Five-mile zone
The Holy Grail 
This article examines the background to the changes now 
being proposed for the status of the artisanal fishing zone in Peru
In several Latin American countries,the complementary objectives ofsecuring artisanal fishing rights and
conserving marine resources are
enshrined in law. Thus ‘artisanal fishing
zones’ have come to be recognized as
special kinds of marine reserves, where
small-scale fishing is allowed to take place
without interference from larger-scale
activities. Intensive, non-selective and
destructive fishing activities (often
referred to as ‘industrial fishing’, and
geared to the production of fishmeal) are
banned from these close-to-shore zones.
The recognition of reserved artisanal
fishing zones has, in many cases, come
after long and hard-won (and ongoing)
struggles, particularly in the two
neighbouring Southern Cone countries of
Chile and Peru. Here ‘exclusive artisanal
zones’ have been established within a
boundary of five nautical miles from the
shoreline. 
Despite these advances, artisanal fishing
zones are subject to continuing
incursions, both legal and illegal, by
industrial and large-scale fishing
operations. Clashes are also increasingly
prevalent between artisanal fishing
communities and aquaculture
enterprises. Again, aquaculture
enterprises may operate both legally
(through being granted concessions) or
illegally. In some Latin American
countries, aquaculture enterprises have
been set up illegally following violent
(often armed) seizure of land and the
intimidation of local communities
through killings and torture.
In addition, it is an unfortunate fact of life
that some government functionaries are
not impartial actors in the decision- and
law-making processes. In many countries,
the investment sector (for intensive
aquaculture and industrial fisheries) often
carries more political clout than
small-scale fisheries. Worse still,
high-ranking government officials may
also be the captains of those very
industries seeking to gain access to
conservation areas reserved for artisanal
fishing. 
In Chile, Ecoceanos News of 15 October
2004 reports that allegations of ‘illegal
enrichment’ have resulted in a Special
Parliamentary Commission being set up
to investigate the ‘black market’ in
aquaculture concessions. Aquaculture
concessions are allocated free of charge,
and with no time limit set. The only
requirement is the payment of a nominal
annual charge of between 60,000 and
120,000 pesos (approximately
US$100-200). The owner is then free to
lease or sell these freely acquired
concessions. Ecoceanos reports that in
some regions such concessions may sell
for as much as US$1 mn.
In August 2001, the Chilean Fisheries
Subsecretary, Daniel Albaran, resigned
amid allegations of corruption and
professional misconduct. Albarran was, at
the same time, the chairman of several
aquaculture enterprises and Fisheries
Subsecretary. In his public function, he
was responsible for approving large
numbers of aquaculture concessions. In
business, he had an interest in how
concessions were allocated. He may well
come under the scrutiny of the
Parliamentary Commission. 
Aquaculture concessions
Likewise, in Peru, the handing out of
aquaculture concessions in traditional
fishing areas, in both the coastal areas and
inland waters, has been strongly
criticized. There have been fierce conflicts
between artisanal fishermen and
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access rights in several fishing
communities along the coast—Chimbote,
Samanco, Casma, Callao, Pisco and Ilo. 
Given a situation of increasinginsecurity, and faced withgrowing threats to their
livelihood rights from competing
interests, artisanal fishworkers from
Chile and Peru have recently committed
themselves to establishing an
International Commission in Defence of
the Five-Mile Zone. The commission was
established earlier this year during the
Second Bi-National Peru-Chile Artisanal
Fishermen’s Meeting that took place in
the northern Chilean city of Arica, from
1-2 July 2004. Then, in September 2004, in
the Port of Ilo, Peru, the commission
organized an International Forum on
Artisanal Fishing to widen the network
and to articulate more clearly the
demands of artisanal fishworkers. In
parallel, non-governmental
organizations in the Southern Cone
region, from Chile, Argentina and
Uruguay, met in July 2004 to set up a
Southern Cone Coalition to promote
sustainable fisheries and social equity in
the region.
In 1992, an area was legally reserved for
artisanal fishing in the near-shore waters
of Peru through Supreme Decree D.S.
017-92. This established the zone adjacent
to the coast: “comprising the area
between zero and five nautical miles, as a
conservation zone for the flora and fauna
that exist there”. “Carrying out fishing
activities for direct or indirect human
consumption with purse seines, and with
other methods, gear and fishing devices
that modify the biological conditions of
the marine environment” is banned. The
decree was passed due to “the serious
interference of industrial fishing fleets and
fleets fishing for direct human
consumption in zones declared as the
exclusive reserve for the operation of
artisanal fishing vessels.” It recognizes the
importance of this zone for “upwelling
and the breeding of the principal fishery
resources that sustain the fishery for direct
human consumption”, and the need to
“establish measures conducive for its
protection”.
In 1995, another Supreme Decree
modified some of these conditions, and
clarified that the ban on purse-seining
refers only to industrial fishing, and not to
artisanal fishing. It also clarified that the
0-5 nautical mile zone is reserved for
artisanal fishing and, as such, that
artisanal purse-seines may be used in the
zone, so long as they comply with the
criteria set by the Ministry of Fisheries. 
Fierce conflicts
But the permission granted to artisanal
purse-seining activities in the five-mile
zone has led to fierce conflicts in the
northern region of Tumbes. Thus, in
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Production was forced to call in the navy
to establish control measures on the
activities of the so-called vikingos chicos
(little vikings) and bolichitos
(mini-purse-seines) in the sea around
Tumbes.
The 1995 modification also makesthe ban conditional on the technicalopinion of Peru’s Marine Institute
(IMARPE). And here lies the bone of
contention for artisanal fishermen in the
south of the country, notably those from
the port town of Ilo. In February 2001,
IMARPE published a technical report, titled
The Problematic of the Five Miles in the South
of Peru and Technical Alternatives for its
Management. The report observes that, in
the south of the country, the distribution
and concentration of the main fishery
resources are localized in the zone 10 miles
from the coast. This is due to climatic and
oceanographic factors, and the presence of
a very narrow continental shelf. In this
southern region, the shelf width averages
five nautical miles, but ranges from a
maximum of 13 nautical miles to less than
two (compared to 70 nautical miles in the
northern region around Chimbote). 
IMARPE notes that the concentration of
fishery resources becomes more
pronounced in summer (between
December and March), especially in the
five-mile zone. Its report provides an
overview of oceanographic conditions in
the southern region, and describes the
spawning behaviour of the Peruvian
anchovy. Known locally as anchoveta
(Engraulis ringens), it is the main species
targeted by industrial fishing activities
supplying the fishmeal processors. The
report then goes on to describe the
activities of both the industrial and
artisanal fishery in the south of the
country.
In Peru, some 700 marine species are
legally classified according to whether
they are destined for direct human
consumption (some 150 species) or for
industrial purposes (2-3 main species,
including anchovy/ anchoveta—
Engraulis ringens and Anchoa nasus—and
sardine). In fact, it has recently become
national government policy to mobilize
supplies of fish (scad, locally called jurel,
and mackerel, caballa) to address the
problems of widespread malnutrition
amongst the low-income segments of the
Peruvian population. This has been
enshrined in law through Supreme Decree
D.S. 021-2004, which establishes special
conditions for the catch of industrial
fishmeal vessels to be used for human
consumption. But FIUPAP is highly critical
of this, pointing out that the industrial
sector targeting these resources is already
overcapacity. Rather, priority should be
given to developing the artisanal sector
and providing market support to ensure
that fishermen obtain a fair price and
low-income consumers an affordable
food.
IMARPE’s 2001 report documents the
significant increase in fishmeal processing
capacity since 1997 in the south of the
country, and the resulting increase in
fishing effort for anchovy, particularly in
the summer. In the period 1990-95, the
industrial fleet operating out of the port of
Ilo remained more or less constant,
reaching a maximum of 85 vessels in 1992.
By 2000, vessel numbers had increased to
165, with a peak of activity in the summer
months. 
In the period 1991-92, more than 60 per
cent of the southern industrial fish catch
(for fishmeal) was taken within five miles
of the coast. During the summer months
between 1993 and 1997, this rose to 80 per
cent. The report also notes that, in most
years, anchovy represents more than 80
per cent of the industrial catch. It refers to
an additional 10 species caught by the
industrial fleet classified as species for
human consumption, but claims that
industrial fishing activities have had little
impact on the mainstay species of the
artisanal sector. 
In a subsequent report on artisanal fishing
in the zone 16˚S - 18˚20’S, IMARPE states
that over the period 1996-2002, 65 per cent
of the artisanal fishing fleet’s activities
were carried out in the 0-1.5 mile zone,
and 99.5 per cent within the 2.5 mile zone.
These observations have been hotly
contested by the artisanal sector. They
claim that part of the sector has been
forced to retreat inshore to avoid
interference from the industrial sector. 
New sector
Also, in the last few years, a new deep-sea
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fishing boats range as far out as 150 miles
to catch perico (Coryphaena spp) and sharks
(Tiburon diamante and Tiburon azul). 
The IMARPE study only looked atactivities in the five-mile zone, andnot outside it. As such, it provides
an incomplete picture. Also, it only looks
at interference between sectors, and not
into sustainability issues. The Ilo
fishermen, therefore, contest the validity
of the report and its use for policy
decision making.
The IMARPE report states that “due to the
greater concentration of fishery resources
in the coastal zone in the summer months,
the application of a seasonal exception is
justified in this period, that would allow
for less interference with artisanal fishing.
As there is a much smaller artisanal fleet
South of 18˚S (that is, up to the Chilean
border), free fishing should be allowed in
this area during this period.” The report
goes on: “One measure that could be
applied is that when industrial fishing
vessels fish inside the five-mile zone and
catch fish classified as being for human
consumption, these could be given to the
artisanal fishermen,” with the caveat that
“so long as catch controls are improved
for the by-catch of fish for direct human
consumption. This would also require
improving the port infrastructure (the
artisanal fishing quays) and establishing
marketing channels.” 
For the artisanal fishermen, the
conclusions and recommendations
provide stark prospects. According to
IMARPE, the applicability of the five-mile
zone law in the south of the country is not
in line with the seasonal oceanographic
variations and changes in species
abundance. 
They, therefore, recommend that “during
the summer, there should be a seasonal
exception to the five-mile law”. This
would involve allowing the industrial
fleet to fish to within three miles of the
coast in a belt of about 120 miles (16˚S to
17˚59’S). From 18˚S to the Chilean border,
industrial vessels would be allowed to
fish freely right up to the coast. “In all
cases, by-catch of species for human
consumption should be handed over to
the artisanal fishing community.” 
In December 2003, these
recommendations found their way into
Peruvian fisheries law. Supreme Decree
No 037-2003 calls for a special fisheries
regime to be established for anchovy in
the southern region, from 16˚S to Peru’s
border with Chile. It proposes that access
be allowed to larger-scale purse-seiners to
specified areas (so-called ‘penetration
windows’) within the artisanal five-mile
zone. 
The law also establishes that a special,
non-Statal, financing mechanism
(FONDEMPASUR) be set up for the
development and modernization of the
artisanal fishing sector in the southern
region. This is to be financed by a levy
placed on each metric tonne of fish landed
by licensed industrial fishing operations. 
The law also specifies that all fish caught
other than anchovy should be handed
over to the authorities at the nearest
artisanal fish landing quay, or to the most
representative organization of artisanal
fishermen. Permission is also given to the
owners of artisanal fishing vessels to catch
anchovy, and, under exceptional
circumstances, sell it for human
consumption. 
In effect, the industrial sector is required
to set up a compensation fund in exchange
for being given these ‘windows of
penetration’, and is being ordered to do
the artisanal fishermen’s work of catching
fish for human consumption. 
This decree is more or less exactly what
the industrial fishing sector had been
lobbying for. It is strongly backed by the
southern fishmeal producers
organization, APROSUR, which claims that
in 2003, due to the lack of nationwide
access to the five-mile zone, some US$ 95
mn worth of foreign exchange from
potential fishmeal exports was lost to the
nation, and further, that in the southern
region, potential US$ 17.33 mn and 4,000
jobs were lost due to fishmeal plant
closures. They say that the IMARPE report
completely vindicates their claims. 
Coastal fishing
“The (artisanal zone) decree applies to the
whole coast without taking into account
the difference in the nature of the coastline
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Chimbote, the shelf extends to 70 miles, in
Ilo, it hardly reaches 3.5 miles. This means
that the (southern) industrial fishing has
to be predominantly coastal,” they say. 
They claim that reserving thefive-mile zone for artisanal fishingmakes their industry less
competitive than Chile’s. “The anchovy
that is not caught by the Peruvian fleet is
caught by the Chilean industrial vessels,”
they say. APROSUR and the National
Society of Fishing Vessel Owners
(SONAPE) have been actively organizing
demonstrations and other lobbying efforts
to raise public awareness and influence
the political processes in their favour. The
artisanal fishermen of Ilo have strongly
challenged both the IMARPE findings and
the claims of the industrial fishing sector.
They accuse the Minister of Production,
Javier Reátegui Roselló, of being both
judge and jury, given his personal
interests in the fishmeal industry. In their
view, allowing ‘windows of penetration’
for the industrial fishery in the south is
tantamount to ruining the fishery. 
According to them, the anchovy and other
fishery resources of the south represent a
natural resource bank. It is of major
importance as a feeding and spawning
area, which is disrupted and harmfully
transformed by industrial fishing
activities. They claim that “measures like
making exceptions to closed seasons in the
south or making penetration windows in
the border area for the industrial fishery
are irrational, and undermine the
sustainability of the fishery by not
guaranteeing any resource or income for
tomorrow.” 
They report that there are around 1,500
organized artisanal fishermen based
around the port of Ilo. The main
organization is the Sindicato nico de
Pescadores Civiles del Puerto de Ilo
Artesanales-Buzos (SUPABCPI), which is a
member of the national artisanal
fishermen’s federation, FIUPAP. They
claim that there are a similar number of
unorganized fishermen in the region as
well. 
Artisanal fishing activities around Ilo,
which are all aimed at producing food for
human consumption, are diverse:
mini-purse-seines (bolichito), gill-nets,
high-seas fishing, launch (pintero) fishing,
line fishing, shellfish gathering, and
diving using both compressors and
aqualung. Over the last 10 years, these
activities have undergone considerable
change. For example, there are very few
launches (pintero) and gill-nets (cortineros)
today. The artisanal fishers claim that the
root cause of these changes is the impact
of industrial fishing.
Localized overfishing
On the one hand, the inshore sector has
been increasingly pushed toward the
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industrial fishing vessels. This has
resulted in localized overfishing and a
particular demise of the shellfish
resources. 
In response, closed seasons have been
established, although no seasonal bans on
the sale of closed-season species have
been applied. This has tended to
encourage illegal fishing. Traditional
fishing areas have also been designated as
areas for aquaculture concessions,
putting further pressure on fishermen
and resources in the increasingly
restricted areas where they can fish.
On the other hand, an offshore artisanal
fishing sector has developed in the last
few years. Due to interference from the
industrial sector, artisanal fishermen have
been extending their range of operations
to as far out as 150 miles, according to Ilo
fishermen. But conditions are very harsh,
with fishermen spending more than two
weeks away from their families, and
working in extremely dangerous and
exposed conditions. Not only are there
significant investment costs to be made in
navigation equipment and fishing gear,
but, with dramatically increasing fuel





Final Statement of the Ilo Forum
The first International Forum on Artisanal
Fishing convened by the International Defence
Committee of the Five-Mile Zone, meeting from
29 to 30 September 2004 in Ilo, Peru, declares
that:
The conservation of marine biodiversity and the
protection of fishery resources are fundamental
in assuring a supply of indispensable food for
humanity, as well as in assuring the livelihoods
of the communities that depend on fishing.
The coastal zone within five nautical miles is
pre-requisite to the conservation of resources,
providing an area for spawning, growing and
nutrient upwelling, and, for these reasons, it
should neither be subject to intensive fishing
activities nor used as a dump for the industrial
wastes that destroy it.
For these reasons, industrial fishing activities
should be excluded from this zone, which
should be used exclusively for artisanal fishing
with selective and non-destructive fishing gear.
Under no circumstances should industrial
fishing be allowed in this zone through
’windows of penetration’.
In order to ensure its own sustainability, the
industrial fishing sector should try to overcome
its dependence on fishing for fishmeal, and
target a greater variety of species for producing
value-added products, following the principles
of responsible fisheries and with greater
benefits for the fishing communities. 
In order to ensure the sustainable management
of fishery resources and the marine
environment, as well as the full participation of
fishermen in decisions that affect them, we
demand that the FAO Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries be turned into an
International Treaty with the force of law.
The application of individual transferable quota
systems fragments and divides artisanal fishing
communities, depriving them of their rights and
transforming them into a low-cost workforce for
the industrial sector, due to which we reject
their implementation.
In the case of Peru, we demand the lifting of
Decree 037 that establishes ‘windows of
penetration’ and the aspects of the fisheries
law that allow these kinds of rules; in the case
of Chile, we demand the lifting of the regime of
‘windows of penetration’ in the north of the
country and an end to the quota system; in
Mexico, we demand that Rule 002 that
prohibits trawling in the five-mile zone be
respected; and with regard to Argentina,
Uruguay and Brazil, we express our concerns
and reject the development of an anchovy
fishery for fishmeal, which threatens the
ecosystems of the region.
We call for the Second Forum of the
International Commission for the Defence of
the Five-Mile Zone to be implemented on the
29 and 30 September 2005 in Sinaloa, Mexico.
Also, and on the invitation of the Chilean
delegation, we have decided to meet again
during 20-22 November in Valparaiso, Chile,
where the Congress of the National
Confederation of Artisanal Fishermen will be
held.
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economic struggle, particularly as fishing
trips may clock up distances of 700 miles.
Since its introduction, the December2003 Supreme Decree has beenhamstrung by the extreme
polarization of the situation. In January
2004, the Ilo fishermen initiated a
‘Peruvian Five-Mile Zone Defence
Committee’, supported by fishermen
from Arequipa, Ilo and Tacna. This was
followed up by a number of strikes in the
south, aimed at disrupting fishing and
related activities. 
These local activities took on national
significance when, at the end of March
2004, FIUPAP called for an indefinite
national artisanal fishermen’s strike
starting on 5 April. This was scheduled to
coincide with the start of the Holy Week,
a time when many Peruvian families
traditionally eat fish. Subsequently,
FIUPAP asked the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
to intervene formally in the process,
claiming that article 6.18 of the FAO Code
of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries
supported their claims for a five-mile
zone, and was a just cause for complaint.
On 1 April 2004, the Ministry of
Production suspended the
implementation of the new access regime
for three months. At the same time, an
Enquiry Commission was established to
evaluate the proposed new fisheries
regime, and to report within 75 days. This
‘temporary suspension’ has since been
renewed twice—on 1 July for 90 days, and
then, most recently, on 4 October 2004 for
a further 90 days, up to January 2005. The
most recent suspension came four days
after the first International Forum on
Artisanal Fishing, and was considered a
victory.
But although a battle may have been won,
the ‘windows of penetration’ law still
poses a very clear and present danger. It is
only a matter of time—three short months
before the current suspension expires. In
the meantime, the government and
industrial sectors are gathering
information to support their case to lift the
five-mile zone restrictions in the south.
Nevertheless, the artisanal fishermen of
Peru continue to protest, to organize
themselves in readiness for the next
onslaught, and to widen their support
base in defence of their sacrosanct
five-mile zone—a zone that is fast
becoming the Holy Grail of artisanal
fishermen throughout Latin America, and
a banner under which they are uniting to
defend their rights. They will need all the
strength and support they can muster if
they are to prevail in the unequal power
struggle with the mighty industrial
fisheries lobby, who have influential




This article has been compiled by
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using news items and official
documents available on the
Internet
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Fisheries co-operation
Welcoming and friendly
This is an account of an exchange trip of two 
South African community leaders from fishing villages to Mozambique
In August this year, two communityleaders from fishing villages alongthe Western Cape coast of South
Africa visited fishing villages along the
coast of Mozambique. Nico Waldeck and
Charles Thompson were representing
Masifundise Development Trust and the
fishing communities with whom
Masifundise works. The trip was
organized by the Trust for Community
Outreach and Education (TCOE), a
non-governmental network of
organizations to which Masifundise is
affiliated. The aim of the trip was to
enable leaders from rural communities in
South Africa to learn from the
experiences of rural people’s movements
in Mozambique, to share strategies for
organizing and to build alliances and
networks.  
This was the first time that either of the
two fishers had ever visited fishers in
another country, and they were both very
excited and curious when they left South
Africa and crossed the border into
Mozambique. Although community
leaders have been concerned about the
poverty and problems facing small-scale
fishers in South Africa, they were shocked
to see the difficulties faced by fishers in
Mozambique.  
Nico reports on the aspects that struck
him the most:  “Mozambique is a land of
many faces. On the one hand, it is a very
green landscape, with beautiful fishing
areas, a tourist’s paradise. On the other, it
is a land with very visible poverty,
especially within the fishing
communities. Mozambique has been
badly affected by the war of
independence with the former colonial
power, Portugal. The infrastructure in the
fishing villages is of very poor quality.
The roads to, and in, the fishing villages
are chaotic. The majority of the fishers’
houses are made of reeds. There are no
facilities or factories, not even freezing
facilities in the communities. As a result,
fishers are forced to sell their catch for very
low prices on a daily basis. Low prices
mean that fishers must catch fish every
day. This places heavy pressure on the fish
resources. The boats and equipment are
also very outdated. For the first time in my
life, I saw fishers go to sea without
protective clothing or safety gear.
Women are also very involved in the
fishing industry. They play a big role in
the harvesting as well as in the buying and
selling of fish. It is also obvious that the
government of Mozambique does not
have the financial resources and
manpower to protect and manage their
fish resources effectively.
The highlight of the fishing industry in
Mozambique is the fish market in Maputo.
Here you can buy fish and prepare it right
there. You can choose from a great variety
of food fit for a king, such as crayfish,
lobster, calamari, oysters and many more.
Although the fishers are very poor, they
are very welcoming and friendly. The
fishing industry in Mozambique urgently
needs development. Development is
necessary so that the resources can be
protected and the fishers can derive a
livelihood from the fishing industry.”  
Raising awareness
On his return to South Africa, Nico has
been actively raising awareness about the
conditions facing fishers in Mozambique.
It is his dream to be able to send the fishers
that he met in Mozambique a wooden
boat built on the west coast of South
Africa.  It is hoped that this trip will be the
beginning of a process of building
solidarity amongst fishers within the
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2004, Nico and Charles will have the
opportunity to reciprocate the warm
hospitality they received in Mozambique
when they and other fishers working with
Masifundise in South Africa will host a
conference for leaders from fishing and
coastal communities in the Southern








This report is based on an account
by Nico Waldeck (jackie@tcoe.
org.za or naseegh@masifundise.
org.za), a community leader from
Lambert’s Bay on the west coast
of South Africa. He also serves as a
community representative on the
Masifundise Board of Trustees and
is an active member of ‘Coastal
Links’, the regional structure
representing fisher and coastal
communities in the Western Cape
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Fisheries management
Coming together with confidence
This article looks at co-management of lake 
resources in Uganda through ‘beach management units’
Fisheries resources throughout theworld are under increasingpressure, and effective approaches
to improve management are being
sought. Many countries are looking for
ways to involve fisheries users in
management and the term ‘fisheries
co-management’ has been adopted to
refer to a broad range of user-government
partnerships. This shift is in recognition
of the failure of centralized management
of fisheries to maintain stock levels and
secure dependent livelihoods within
fisheries communities. 
Co-management has been defined as “a
sharing of responsibility and authority
for resource management between the
government and local resource
users/community” (“Community-based
and co-management institutions for
sustainable coastal fisheries management
in Southeast Asia", by R. S Pomeroy,
Ocean & Coastal Management, 27 (3), 1995).
There are, however, different
interpretations of co-management, with
different types of responsibilities and
levels of authority shared between
communities and government. The
different approaches to co-management
have implications for how fisheries
stakeholders, particularly the boat crew
and women, benefit from
co-management. 
Recent experience from Uganda in the
implementation of a co-management
approach to fisheries management
demonstrates how the more
marginalized stakeholders in
fisheries—the boat crew and women—
can be empowered through legislation,
capacity building and participation in
decision making.
The contribution of fisheries to the
national economy of Uganda is
considerable, with an annual economic
value of US$301 mn (Ministry of Finance,
Planning and Economic Development
figures for 2004). Over 300,000 people are
directly employed in the capture fisheries
sector, many of whom are the poorest in
rural society, with a further 1.2 mn people
in rural households dependent on the
sector. The government recognized that
this significant contribution to poverty
reduction can only be maintained and
increased if the management of fisheries
resources involves all relevant
stakeholders, including the poor and
women. 
To implement the new fisheries
co-management approach, the
government, through its Department of
Fisheries Resources (DFR), developed and
approved the first-ever National Fisheries
Policy (NFP) in March 2004, developed a
provisional Fisheries Sector Strategic Plan
(FSSP) and passed legislation to empower
new fisheries community groups called
‘beach management units’ (BMUs). The
BMUs are designed to ensure that the poor
and women participate in key
decision-making processes. A draft
Fisheries Bill (2004) has been developed
that will strengthen the new approach
considerably, strengthening new
institutions and reforming fisheries
taxation. 
Significant move
This article explains how BMUs represent
a significant move from the past,
centralized approach to fisheries
management, how they operate and how
those involved in capture fisheries,
particularly the boat crew and women,
benefit from the roles and responsibilities
of BMUs and from the legislation that
supports their active involvement. In
Uganda, as in most other countries,
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vested with central government using
out-posted fisheries staff. The
administration and management was
based on a command-and-control
approach. There was very little or no
participation by fisheries communities in
resource planning, management and
development. 
At various stages in pastmanagement history, informalinstitutions were established,
including local fisheries leaders, known as
gabungas, landing site committees and
fisheries taskforces. Representatives in all
these informal institutions were not
democratically elected, and had no legal
status; their functions were not clearly




using these institutions within a
centralized approach was not very
effective and did not reflect the needs of
all fisheries stakeholders. Many fisherfolk
were excluded from decision making and
management, particularly boat crew (the
fishermen) and women fishmongers and
processors. 
In light of the failure of the centralized
approach to tackle harmful fishing
practices and sustainably manage
resources, and in line with the
Government of Uganda’s
decentralization policy, Uganda adopted
a new, more participatory approach to
fisheries management. 
This approach is founded upon principles
underpinning wider government policies
that promote poverty-focused and
gender-sensitive development strategies.
It aims to build good governance,
transparency and accountability in
fisheries management. It deepens
decentralization through participatory
fisheries planning and management. This
includes marginalized stakeholders,
especially poor fishing crew members and
women in decision-making structures and
processes governing the management of
resources upon which their livelihoods
depend. This co-management approach
brings fishing communities and
government together for more effective
management and implementation of
policies and regulations. 
In developing the new NFP and the
provisional FSSP, the government held
several consultative workshops with local
government officials and representatives
of all fisheries stakeholder groups. This
consultation resulted in consensus and
raised awareness about the new approach
and ensured that policy was informed by
experience and practice. 
Sustainable exploitation
The primary objective of the NFP is to







SAMUDRA Report No. 39 November 2004 31
culture of the fishery resources at the
highest possible levels, thereby
maintaining fish availability for both
present and future generations, without
degrading the environment”. 
There is no explicit mention ofaccess rights and livelihoods, butthe key policy strategies clearly
demonstrate a strong commitment to a
new co-management approach. Policy
commitments on devolution of some
decision-making responsibilities to
communities and local government, the
formation of sustainable institutions at all
levels for fisheries management, and
co-operation between local government
and communities, guide the
implementation of the co-management
approach in Uganda. 
In order for BMUs to become fully
effective, the DFR recognized that they
must associate with one another and with
local governments to manage lake
resources using an ecosystem approach.
This is being achieved by the formation of
Lake Management Organizations (LMOs),
bringing together the local governments
and communities bordering a lake, and
addressing catchment issues that affect
lake resources.  The NFP also includes
plans to create a Uganda Fisheries
Authority (UFA) to take over from the DFR.
The UFA will be an autonomous
institution under the parent Ministry of
Agriculture, Animal Industries and
Fisheries (MAAIF), which will be more
flexible than a government department,
more responsive and client-oriented,
while costing less money for the
government, through raising money
within the sector. 
The provisional FSSP was developed to
implement the policy and includes
detailed activities and spending plans.
This document is used by the DFR to lobby
for funds within MAAIF. The plan was
instrumental in ensuring that DFR could
lobby effectively during the revision of
Uganda’s Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (PRSP),  the overarching policy
framework, for poverty reduction
required by the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund for debt
relief for Highly Indebted Poor Countries
(HIPCs). Uganda’s PRSP is known as the
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)
and it is essential that fisheries and key
action areas within fisheries that will lead
to poverty reduction are included in the
PEAP to secure resources for
implementation.
DFR was successful in ensuring that
fisheries is included in the revised PEAP,
and the need for financial support for the
formation and capacity building of
fisheries co-management was noted as a
priority area. This strengthens the ability
of fisheries stakeholders in lobbying for
resources to improve livelihoods, while
also increasing productivity. 
Fisheries co-management is being
implemented through the formation of
BMUs at designated landing sites, as
required by the Fish (Beach Management)
Rules, Statutory Instrument No. 35, July
2003. They are the institutional structures
within which fisheries stakeholders work
in partnership with local and central
governments, to improve planning and to
sustainably manage fisheries resources.
Over 200 BMUs have been formed, mainly
on Lakes Kyoga, George and Edward,
with hundreds more expected on Lakes
Victoria and Albert. 
The statutory instrument is accompanied
by detailed guidelines that set out how
BMUs should be formed (such as raising
awareness, registering members and
holding elections for the committee) and
who should be on the BMU committee. The
legislation requires that boat crew have 30
per cent of the places on the BMU
committee, and that women, wherever
possible, also have 30 per cent of places.
The percentage allocations are one way of
ensuring that all fisheries stakeholders
participate in decision making,
safeguarding against domination by
stakeholder groups that have traditionally
managed landing sites, that is, fishing
boatowners who invariably do not fish
themselves. The legal allocations are
supported by capacity building,
monitoring and, in the future, by
development initiatives to build the
capacity of boat crew and women in
decision making and leadership. 
UK aid
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(DFID)-funded project, Integrated Lake
Management (ILM, www.ilm.mrag.co.uk),
BMUs have been formed on Lakes George
and Kyoga. Lake Kyoga is in the centre of
Uganda, covering around 2,800 sq km,
with 10 districts bordering the lake.
George is a much smaller lake, in the
southwest of Uganda, within the Queen
Elizabeth Protected Area. It covers 260 sq
km, with three districts bordering the lake.
Table 1 shows the composition of these
BMUs in terms of men and women, and
stakeholder groups.
Table 1 shows that 11 per cent of BMU
members on Kyoga are women, whereas
the much smaller Lake George has 18.6 per
cent women. On Kyoga, there are, on
average, 2.5 boat crew per boat, and on
George, 3.5 per boat. The higher figure on
Lake George is due to sharing of boats and
licences and the fact that Lake Kyoga
includes dugout canoes where owners
also go fishing. 
Not all the BMUs on Lakes Kyoga and
George have complied with government
regulations on the composition of the
committees. Forty-five per cent of the
BMUs on Lake Kyoga had 30 per cent or
more women on the committee, and 73 per
cent had 30 per cent or more boat crew. In
some fisheries, such as male-dominated
dugout canoes, there is justification for
fewer women and boat crew on the
committee (as the boat owners also crew
the boats, so there are fewer registered
boat crew), but in other cases, more effort
is required to improve poverty focus and
gender sensitivity. On Lake George, two
of the eight BMUs have fewer women than
required by law on the committees, and
one has fewer boat crew. 
Resistance to the allocation of committee
member places to boat crew and women
was particularly strong at two landing
sites on Lake George, where the
dominance of a small group of
boatowners had prevailed for decades.
The boatowners were able to lobby at
ministerial level for a change in the
guidelines, but were unsuccessful, largely
due to the counter efforts of the DFR and
district political leadership. The same
groups did, however, succeed in slowing
down the election process, but eventually
accepted the prescribed procedures and
committee composition. 
This does not mean that opposition to the
new approach has disappeared. It is
expected that, in some places, dominant
groups may still try to use the new
arrangements to continue their
dominance. 
Effective participation
Boat crew and women, in particular, need
support and capacity building to ensure
they can effectively participate in decision
making within BMUs and are able to resist







Table 1: BMU Composition on Lakes Kyoga and George





BMU members 42,281 2,478
Men 37,630 2,017
Women 4,651 461
Boat owners 8,572 444
Boat crew 24,740 1,158
Fish mongers 3,823 288
Fish processors 2,121 44
Other fisheries stakeholders 3,025 544
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dominate the management of, and the
share of benefits (legal and illegal) from,
fisheries resources.  
In terms of planning for, andmanaging, fisheries resources, whatare BMUs doing? The statutory
instrument clearly sets out their roles and
responsibilities, but the main areas of
activity can be summarized as:
• collecting information that can be
used in planning and making
management decisions, for the
fisheries, but also for development
of the landing sites; 
• using this information for taking
local and lake-wide management
decisions and making
management plans, by BMUs, lake
management organizations and
government;
• monitoring fishing activities and




• participating in control of access to
the lake for fishing. Participatory
processes for the licensing of boats
promotes greater transparency
and accountability within local
communities. 
From these roles, many benefits are
expected from BMUs, both in terms of
better management and, therefore, higher
productivity, but also in terms of
empowerment and poverty reduction.
BMUs provide an entry point to fisheries
communities and have enabled local
government and non-governmental
organizations to work more effectively
with these communities, now they are
organized and the structures are inclusive.
BMUs are mandated to contribute to local
government development planning and
the new government-led,
community-based planning approach to
local government development planning
provides an ideal route through which
BMUs can participate in planning and
lobby for resources. 
In 2002, prior to the formation of BMUs, the
government decentralized licensing
powers to the administrative heads of
local government. On Lake George, a lake
with a fixed number of boat licences, this
coincided with an evaluation of the
number of licences and the procedures of
issuing licences. It was agreed between all
stakeholders that a participatory process
would be developed that would increase
access by boat crew and women to boat
licences, while also ensuring continuity of
licensing for livelihood security. New
procedures are now in place, with benefits
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Although BMUs were only formedon Lakes Edward, George andKyoga in late 2003, their
performance was assessed in June 2004 to
provide baseline data and to identify areas
where capacity building and support are
particularly needed. The ILM project spent
five years working on Lake George,
compared to three supporting Edward to
some extent, and three on Kyoga. The
scale of Kyoga meant that
capacity-building efforts required
considerable resources and, so the Kyoga
BMUs have not performed as well as the
fewer BMUs on Lakes Edward and George.
Further capacity building and support is
needed to build on the capacity building
already provided.
Performance was assessed using a
monitoring framework provided in the
Guidelines for BMUs, issued by DFR in
2003. A selection of the results from this
monitoring programme is shown in Table
2.
The results show that many of the BMUs
have already held meetings and that over
half (55 per cent) are recording the views
of women and crew in minutes of
meetings. All the BMUs on Lakes Edward
and George and over half on Kyoga are
collecting fisheries information. This is
very encouraging, as ILM had only
recently rolled out training on fisheries
information collection on Kyoga. Almost
half the BMUs are addressing the challenge
of the use of illegal fishing gear. The
performance of BMUs, in terms of
bookkeeping, is disappointing, and
highlights the need for more support on
financial management for BMUs. 
Fisheries provide a significant livelihood
from lake resources. However, for
effective lake and fisheries management,
BMUs must come together for
co-ordination and coherence between
management plans. 
BMUs can associate with one another, both
between BMUs at different landing sites
and to form different levels of association.
They may wish to associate at different
levels of local government. On both Lakes
George and Kyoga, LMOs have been
formed to develop and implement lake
management plans. 
The Lake George Basin Integrated
Management Organization (LAGBIMO)
and the Lake Kyoga Integrated
Management Organization (LAKIMO) are
founded upon the BMUs, with
representatives attending the lake-wide
assembly and represented on the
executive committee to ensure that their
concerns are addressed across the lake.
The organizations are associations of local
government, formed under the Local
Government Act, 1997, though the BMU
statutory instrument also allows for BMUs
to associate. 
Improved management
The LMOs bring communities and local
governments together for improved lake
management. Such organizations are
essential for developing a harmonized
approach to managing a lake and for
development interventions in the area.
The LMOs are doing much to support the
role of women and boat crew in fisheries
management and beach development,


























Edward 5 100 100 40 100 80
George 8 100 88 25 100 50
Kyoga 186 69 53 14 52 48
Total 203
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decision making, capacity building and
through targeted interventions, as set out
in the management plans.
The fisheries sector generatessignificant revenue. Not only isfish one of the biggest agricultural
export earners for Uganda, it also
generates revenue for local communities
and local government. Some of these
resources are being ploughed back into
the management of lake resources
through both BMUs and local
government. 
Money from fish movement permits,
profits from fish-landing site tenders and
collection of fish or money per boat
landing (as determined through bylaws)
is generating revenue to enable BMUs to
hold meetings, collect valuable
information, plan and implement
decisions and monitor fisheries activities.
The collection of landing fees is tendered
by local government to an external
contractor. The tenderer is contracted to
remit a certain amount to local
government but can collect far in excess
of that amount, removing vast sums from
fisheries resources. 
To address this removal of funds that
could be used for reinvestment, the new
draft Fisheries Bill 2004 includes
provisions for BMUs to collect a Landing
Site User Fee (LSUF). Financial analyses
reveal that this system, if adopted, will
decrease the charges to resource users,
particularly the poor, but, at the same
time, increase the amount going to local
governments for wider development, and
leave a substantial amount for fisheries
management and development by BMUs. 
BMUs are set firmly alongside the
government system. Although they are
not formally part of the government
system, many of the functions set out in
the statutory instrument require close
collaboration with local and central
governments. 
In fact, the parish or village executive
committee is charged with monitoring
and supervising the operations of BMUs.
The Chief Administrative Officer of the
district local council has overall
responsibility and reports directly to the
Commissioner of the Department of
Fisheries Resources. 
Local plans
In order to be effective in management,
BMUs are required to develop local
fisheries management and beach
development plans and advocate for their
integration in other local development
plans. Integration of their plans into local
government development planning,
through Parish Development Plans, will
increase the opportunity for funding and
implementation. This strong integration
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that a BMU works closely with government
and that its plans and activities are
integrated into local government
development and work plans.
The policies and legislation are inplace and over 200 BMUs havealready been formed. It is,
however, very early days for fisheries
co-management in Uganda, and it is
critical that the government, at national
and local levels, provides the support that
BMUs will continue to need to operate
effectively and to ensure that all fisheries
stakeholders benefit. 
The need for support to, and capacity
building of, BMUs and LMOs is clearly set
out in the draft revised PEAP of March
2004, the PRSP of Uganda. This recognition
is critical for DFR and others to lobby for
resources to support fisheries
co-management institutions.
Women and boat crew are already
actively involved in BMUs and are
speaking out on issues of concern to them.
They recognize the opportunities brought
by fisheries co-management. A woman
member of a BMU committee on Lake
George remarked, “I have gained
confidence and exposure. Now I can
contribute to discussions at the BMUs and
in workshops when called, even if men are
present”. 
Uganda has embarked upon an
innovative co-management approach to
fisheries management that, if effectively
implemented, will result in increased
productivity and improved livelihoods.
This will, however, require greater
financial support to the sector to ensure
the new institutions have the capacity to
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Fisheries policy
Anxiety-ridden fishing community
Pakistan fishermen are demanding that their 
government introduce sustainable fisheries management policies
Last month, a packed hall of a hotelin Pakistan’s port city of Karachisaw citizens, experts and
policymakers assemble to discuss the
issues of the fishing community,
especially the fishworkers engaged in the
traditional fisheries along the 350-km
Sindh coastline, and rivers, reservoirs and
lakes scattered across many parts of the
province.
The Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF) had
organized the event and invited the
experts and policymakers to support the
preparation of a fisheries policy draft that
would alleviate the livelihood conditions
of the community. However, in the
absence of effective participation by
government officials, the official point of
view did not come across.
Saeed Baloch, General Secretary of the
PFF, gave a brief overview of the aims of
the seminar. He said that whenever
policymakers introduce policy measures,
they rarely bother to invite the real
stakeholders for discussions. Despite the
fact that about 1.6 mn acres of fertile land
have been destroyed due to acute
shortage of fresh water, the Pakistan
government has decided to build new
dams on the River Indus, he maintained.
Those who have been involved in
agriculture for generations have joined
the fishing sector because their
agricultural lands in the coastal region
have been destroyed. The influx of people
from other sectors adds to the burden of
the fisheries sector. There are no checks
and balances on the part of the
government, and traditional fishworkers
have been forced to be jobless as fish
catches decline day by day.
Sikandar Brohi of the Centre for
Information and Research of the Shaheed
Zuklfiqar Ali Bhutto Institute of Science
and Technology (SZABIST), in his
presentation, detailed the highlights of the
proposed draft prepared by the PFF.
Discussing the problems in introducing
the policy, he said, “It is the responsibility
of the government to introduce
favourable policy, but here, the officials
concerned are indifferent. While
government itself should have taken
efforts to introduce a favourable fisheries
policy in the country, the PFF is forced to
do so.”
Tayyaba Ahmed, a doctoral student of
Karachi University researching the
women-in-fisheries sector, gave a
presentation of the women involved in
fish-related activities in their coastal
localities. Tayyaba said that although
women in shrimp-peeling centres in
coastal neighbourhoods work hard, they
get low wages. Besides, there are no
personal or work-related facilities for
them at these workplaces. Neither is there
any concept of social security for these
women workers. 
Ghulam Mustafa Meerani, from
Manchhar Lake, said: “There are 1,200
water bodies in the Sindh province, of
which 600 have been dehydrated due to
persistent water shortage. There is no
freshwater downstream, hence all lakes in
these two districts have dried. Hundreds
of fishermen who have been engaged in
fishing in these waters for a livelihood
since time immemorial have become
jobless.”
Policy draft
Meerani added: “The government’s
policymakers have never tried to take the
stakeholders into confidence during the
preparation of certain policy drafts.” For
instance, he said, though there is a
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the Fisheries Department, he is practically
ineffectual. Besides, he said, influential
landlords have occupied water bodies in
the province. The largest Manchhar Lake
was once witness to 52 fish and 65 bird
species, apart from hundreds of trees. But
now the once attractive lake is ruined, and
several fisher families have migrated to
other water bodies in search of
livelihoods.
According to Meerani, when theSindh Irrigation Departmentofficials recently released water
from Manchhar Lake to the River Indus,
about 50 people died drinking the
polluted water. But the irony is that the
people of Manchhar Lake continue to use
the same poisonous water.
In his presentation, Mohammed Ali Shah,
PFF chairperson, said: “We have a mission
to launch an effective struggle for the
solution of the problems of fisher
communities. In this matter, we are
engaged in advocacy and lobbying with
the government to solve the problems.”
“Making policy is the responsibility of the
government, but we are working to
improve the policy draft and hope that we
can launch these efforts on the occasion of
World Fisheries Day on 21 November
2004,” he added.
Shah said that hundreds of fishermen are
facing unemployment and poverty
because the government failed to
introduce a sustainable fisheries policy.
Fisher families, he said, are the real
custodians of these waters, but due to the
indifferent attitude of the government,
their lives and livelihoods are at stake.
Officials in Islamabad have issued licences
to deep-sea vessels that help destroy the
country’s fish stocks. Besides, the wide
use of destructive nets, increasing marine
pollution and overfishing are the other
main problems, which have played havoc
with the lives of the traditional fishing
community.
“We have always demanded that the
government allow the trawlers to operate
50 nautical miles away from the seashore.
We have suggested that a proper survey
of fish stocks be carried out to identify the
quantity of fish off the country’s coast.
Then we may be able to determine the
number of trawlers or vessels sufficient
for the exploitation of the fish stocks.”
Sustainable policy
Majeed Motani, a traditional fishworker,
said that a sustainable fisheries policy may
be key to the survival of future
generations of fishing communities.
“There are 17 creeks in the Indus Delta,
which are linked with 5,000 other water
outlets. The most horrible thing is that
hundreds of destructive nets, including
boolo and gujjo, are used at these creeks,
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natural resources. These nets catch
juvenile fish and cause destruction of fish
species. The poor fishworkers with small
boats and nets face many problems,”
Motani said.
Fishing is the only source oflivelihood for about 3 mn peopleliving along the 1,050-km coast.
Pakistan’s coastline is divided into two
parts  the Sindh province, with a 350-km
area, and the Balochistan province coast
of 700 km. The Sindh coast fisherfolk live
in settlements and villages in Karachi,
Thatta and Badin districts of the province.
Haji Shafee Jamot, Director, Fishermen’s
Co-operative Society, opposed the ban on
traditional nets, saying these have been
uses for centuries and are not harmful like
the boolo and gujjo nets. If a ban on
traditional fishing nets continued, it will
affect the fish sector as well as force
hundreds of traditional fisher families
into joblessness, he said. He added that
government officials should decide the
optimal mesh size of the nets to be used,









This report is by Jan Khaskheli
(Jan_khaskheli@yahoo.com), a
freelance writer from Karachi,
who also works with the Pakistan
Fisherfolk Forum
40 SAMUDRA Report No. 39 November 2004
Inshore fisheries
A case to follow
The future of Canadian inshore fisheries 
policy hinges on an upcoming court case
An obscure contractual disputebetween two fishermen couldsoon have a major impact on
access rights to Atlantic Canada’s $1.4 bn
inshore fishery.  The case, scheduled to go
to court in December, will clarify whether
private agreements can subvert public
policy in the fishery.
At stake are two key measures put in place
more than 25 years ago to keep inshore
fishing licences in the hands of working
fishermen and prohibit the concentration
of fishing licences and the vertical
integration of fishing and fish processing
operations in the inshore fishery.
Canada adopted the two measures,
known as the ‘owner-operator’ and
‘fleet-separation’ policies, after extension
of its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 nautical
miles in 1977.  Prior to 1977, European and
Soviet bloc offshore fishing fleets and a
domestic inshore fleet exploited the
enormous marine fishery wealth along
Canada’s Atlantic continental shelf. 
After 1977, government policy
encouraged industrial fishing by offshore
trawlers owned and operated by
Canadian fish processing corporations to
replace the foreign distant-water fleets.
Government planners saw the existing
seasonal inshore fleet as a socioeconomic
liability with low labour productivity,
low-income levels and a chronic over
supply of labour. It was thought that the
new industrial fleet would soon generate
year-round employment opportunities
through backward and forward linkages
to absorb some of the underemployed
inshore fishermen.
The rush towards industrial fishing
alarmed Canada’s independent inshore
fishermen who feared that the highly
capitalized processing companies would
soon extend the industrial model into
their traditional inshore fisheries. To allay
these fears, the government divided the
fisheries access pie in two. The processing
companies, with their offshore trawlers,
were given rights to more than half of the
valuable groundfish allocations, while the
rest of the groundfish was reserved for the
inshore fleet of independent
owner-operators. 
In addition, inshore fleets were given
almost exclusive access to fisheries that, at
the time, were considered less valuable:
species like lobster, crab, herring, scallops,
mackerel, and so on.
Two government policies—the
fleet-separation and owner-operator
policies—established a firewall between
the offshore corporate fleet and the
independent inshore fleet. The
fleet-separation policy prohibited
corporations from acquiring licences for
vessels less than 65 ft (19.8 m) LOA (length
overall), essentially ‘separating’ the
harvesting from the processing, and
making vertical integration illegal in the
inshore fishery. The owner-operator
policy further strengthened the
independent nature of the inshore fleet by
stipulating that licences for species fished
from vessels less than 65 ft must be fished
personally by the licence-holder, that is,
the individual must be on board at all
times directing the fishing operations,
unless otherwise temporarily exempted
for health reasons, for example.
Greater competition
By blocking vertical integration in the
inshore fishery, the fleet-separation policy
stimulated competition amongst fish
buyers for inshore products, while the
owner-operator policy meant that the
economic benefits derived from fishing
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who fish, the captains and crewmembers
of the inshore fleets.
By 1992, the government’s offshorefisheries strategy was in shambles.Overfishing by the industrial fleet,
combined with inadequate management
controls, obliterated the once plentiful
groundfish stocks, and the government
declared a moratorium on most
groundfish species, which is still in effect
today. Ironically, the productivity and
economic value of the inshore fishery
improved steadily during the same
period.
The marketing of live lobster to the US and
Europe increased the incomes of inshore
fishermen, who also intensified their
fishing efforts with improvements in gear
and technology. At the same time, the
previously marginal snow crab fishery
emerged as a multi-million dollar
industry, serving the lucrative Japanese
market and benefiting from a sharp fall in
landings of Alaskan king crab. The
abundance and range of the East Coast
snow crab also improved with
diminished groundfish predation and a
favourable shift in water temperature. 
With both of these species firmly under
the control of owner-operator fleets, the
economic profile of the Atlantic inshore
fishery improved consistently
throughout the 1990s to the point where
it now represents 99 per cent of the
harvesting employment and 75 per cent of
the landed value of the Atlantic fishery.
The owner-operator and fleet-separation
policies effectively blocked concentration
of ownership of licences and ensured that
the economic benefits of the inshore
fishery were widely distributed
throughout hundreds of small coastal
communities in the five eastern Provinces
(Québec, New Brunswick, Prince Edward
Island, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland),
providing good incomes and seasonal
jobs in areas of high unemployment.
The greatly increased economic value of
the inshore fishery, however, did not go
unnoticed by processors and other
investors. With the assistance of lawyers
well versed in property law, they have
opened a legal breach in the protective
policy wall. 
Over the last decade, fish processing
companies, successful inshore fishermen
and investors from outside the fishery
have been using a loophole in the fisheries
regulations to gain control over, and
accumulate, valuable inshore fishing
licences in clear violation of public policy.
Complex processes
The legal aspects of the process are quite
complex.  A fishing licence is not property
in Canada. It is a privilege granted
annually at the absolute discretion of the
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transferring a fishing licence is technically
illegal, it happens all the time through a
government-sanctioned process called the
issuance of a ‘replacement licence’.  
The government initiated thisprocess with the introduction oflimited-entry licensing in the 1970s
and 1980s to facilitate the transfer of
inshore licences between retiring captains
(licence-holders) and younger
fishermen—most often, family members. 
The typical process is that an inshore
licence-holder wishing to retire works out
an agreement with an ‘eligible’ fisherman
for that person to take over the fishing
enterprise as a new entrant. The retiring
licence-holder receives a payment from
the new entrant, then asks the Department
of Fisheries and Oceans  (DFO) to issue
him/her a replacement licence. While
these transactions are commonly referred
to as ‘licence purchases’, in strictly legal
terms, no sale has taken place because a
fishing licence cannot be sold.
The process of issuing replacement
licences to facilitate inter-generational
transfers of licences has become an
accepted practice in the inshore fishery,
and normally would not be a problem,
since government policy states that the
replacement licence can only be issued to
an ‘eligible’ fisherman. 
However, ineligible parties (fish
processing companies, inshore fishermen
who already hold licences and other
investors) have been subverting the
process and gaining control over inshore
licences. They do so by entering into ‘trust
agreements’ with the legal titleholder to
transfer the ‘beneficial use’ of the licence. 
These trust agreements are essentially
contracts that separate the ‘use’ of the
licence from its legal ‘title’. In this way, the
transaction is not illegal, in strictly legal
terms, because the legal title has not been
transferred, only the use.  But, in reality,
the use is everything.  Whoever controls
the use of the licence, controls the money
that can be made from the licence through
fishing.  
A typical transfer transaction occurs as
follows.  A processor or other investor
approaches a licensed fisherman nearing
retirement age and offers to ‘purchase’ the
‘use’ of his or her fishing licence. A trust
agreement is drawn up between the two
parties whereby they agree that the
fisherman will legally transfer to the
purchaser the ‘beneficial use’ of the
fishing licence, and that the fisherman will
ask the DFO to issue a replacement licence
to an eligible person designated by the
purchaser. Usually, the eligible person is a
longstanding crewmember of the retiring
fisherman, who, in turn, also signs an
agreement to transfer the ‘beneficial use’
of the licence to the purchaser.
The new titleholder, however, does not
enter the fishery as an independent
owner-operator but rather as an employee
fishing for a share of the catch or for
wages. The profits from the inshore
fishing enterprise get siphoned off to
those who control the use of the licence—
the holders of the trust agreement. 
The consequences of this can be quite
dramatic. On Canada’s Pacific coast,
where the fleet-separation and
owner-operator policies were never
adopted, control over fishing licences has
fallen largely to investors who, in turn,
lease the licences to working fishermen. In
recent years, the costs of licence leasing
have eaten up to 70 per cent of the landed
value in some Pacific coast fisheries.
By creating the legal fiction of a ‘beneficial
use’ in a licence, ineligible parties have
been gaining surreptitious control over
the Atlantic inshore fishery at an alarming
rate. 
Because of the private nature of the
agreements, it is difficult to know for
certain how extensive the practice is.
However, it is commonly believed that
four small but economically significant
inshore fleets in Nova Scotia (mobile
groundfish, scallop, herring and bluefin
tuna) are now all under processor control.
Some of these same interests and other
powerful investors are now moving to
buy up control over licences in the
valuable inshore lobster and crab fisheries
throughout Atlantic Canada.
Old decision
They are encouraged, in part, by a court
decision several years ago that upheld a
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licence-holder to comply with its
provisions. The existing jurisprudence,
therefore, favours investors intent on
gaining control over inshore licences. 
But this may soon change. Theexisting precedent was establishedin a case without any arguments
presented on the agreement’s impact on
fisheries policy by the government of
Canada or any other party. 
The Canadian Council of Professional
Fish Harvesters (CCPFH), the national
federation of owner-operator fishermen’s
organizations, has received legal opinion
that a different result could be obtained if
the DFO were to defend its policy before
the courts. That now appears to be about
to happen.
The DFO will be called to testify in a new
case that has been winding its way
through the legal process and is about to
come to trial in December in New
Brunswick. The case involves a crab
licence fished under a trust agreement,
one of five discovered by a DFO Gulf
region investigation initiated at the
request of the province of New
Brunswick. 
The DFO’s Gulf region, historically
sympathetic to the owner-operator
fishery, ruled that by surrendering the
‘beneficial use’ of their licences, the
licence-holders were no longer the heads
of their enterprises and were thus
violating the owner-operator policy.
(One licence-holder was also found to be
violating the fleet-separation policy
because the trust agreement was clearly
held by a processing company.) 
The original licences were cancelled, new
temporary licences were issued and the
licence-holders were given a deadline to
sever the trust agreements or risk losing
their licences permanently. Two of the
cases were settled to the satisfaction of the
DFO. 
The three others are still pending, one of
which is scheduled to go to trial in
December. In this case, the lawyers for the
holder of the trust agreement are arguing
that the existing jurisprudence supports
their client and that the titleholder must
fulfill the terms of the contract, including
requesting that the DFO transfer the licence
to their client, which the Gulf region has
indicated that it will refuse to do. 
The case, if it does make it to trial—there
is always the possibility of the parties
settling out of court up until the last
minute—will be the first test of the
strength of government policy and the
government’s resolve to defend it.
Interestingly, the CCPFH has been granted
intervener status in the case and has hired
a well-known university jurist to defend
the government’s policies in court. The
situation is rather unusual since it is the
national fishermen’s organization
initiating the defence of public policy, and
not the government. The CCPFH, however,
took the lead in defending the public
policy when the government was initially
slow to respond.
Beginning in 2000, the CCPFH presented
the DFO and successive Ministers of
Fisheries with a detailed legal analysis of
the threat trust agreements posed to the
fleet-separation and owner-operator
policies, along with the legal remedies
needed to give the policies the force of law.
The DFO’s initial position was that trust
agreements were civil arrangements
between parties and difficult for the
government to monitor. The whole
question was referred to a major review of
its Atlantic fisheries policy launched by
the DFO.
The policy review team (all DFO officials)
initially attempted to sidestep the trust
agreement issue by asserting that the
fleet-separation and owner-operator
policies were fully in effect. 
However, they also proposed that the
different inshore fleets be allowed
‘flexibility’ in the application of the
policies.  This proposal was widely
interpreted as a way to allow those fleets
already under processor control to opt out
of the policies. 
Flexibility proposal
The strong reaction by fishermen’s
organizations to the flexibility proposal
and their continued focus on the trust
agreement problem led the government to
produce a discussion paper and to hold
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stakeholder input on how to deal with the
problem.
In the discussion paper, released in
December 2003, the DFO clearly
recognized, for the first time, that trust
agreements violate public policy. The
document states:
‘Trust agreements’ that purport to
transfer the beneficial use of a licence,
although they have not been
considered as illegal by courts,
contravene the owner-operator and
fleet-separation policies and the Core
fisher designation since they allow a
corporation, third party or entity
other than the licence-holder to
control a licence in the inshore fleet.
(Preserving the Independence of the
Inshore Fleet in Canada’s Atlantic
Fisheries: A Discussion Document, DFO,
2003)
The DFO has yet to announce how it
intends to deal with the problem. The
public consultations, however, revealed
the deep cleavage that exists within the
industry around public policy.
Independent fishermen’s organizations,
provincial governments and coastal
community organizations were almost
unanimous in calling for a strengthening
of the fleet-separation and
owner-operator policies. On the other
hand, fish processing companies and
spokespeople for the fleets they control
called for the elimination of the policies
and the free movement of capital into the
inshore fishery.
There is some urgency to deal with the
problem. The majority of licence-holders
in the inshore fleet are nearing retirement
age and most will transfer their licences to
new entrants over the next 10 years.
Unless the legal loopholes in the public
policy are eliminated, control over these
licences and an annual landed value of
Can$1.4 bn in wild inshore fishery
products will end up in the hands of
non-fishermen.
Enormous stakes
The stakes are enormous in terms of how
the wealth generated by access to this
public resource is distributed. A carefully






SAMUDRA Report No. 39 November 2004 45
designed to keep this wealth in the hands
of working fishermen residing in small
coastal communities could very rapidly
be turned into an empty shell.
Those interested in the links between
fisheries policy and the sustainable
socioeconomic development of coastal
communities should follow the evolution
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Small-scale fishers
The Simonstown Declaration
The Simonstown Declaration by Small-scale 
Fishers was adopted at Cape Town on 5 November 2004
We, the representatives of civilsociety and small-scale fishersand fishing communities* from
the SADC region gathered in Cape Town,
take note of the existence of the SADC
Protocol on Fisheries, its objectives in
Article 3, and, in particular, the content of
Article 12, as well the formal endorsement
of this protocol by the respective SADC
governments in August 2001.
(* Small-scale fishers and fishing
communities refer to all men and women
who are involved in all aspects of
small-scale fisheries, regardless of their
geographical location.)
This conference notes the following:
• the lack of legal recognition of
artisanal and traditional fishers in
certain SADC countries.
• the lack of recognition of the
dignity and integrity of artisanal
and traditional fishers in certain
SADC countries.
• the failure of certain governments
to protect the sustainable
livelihoods of artisanal and
traditional fishers as required by
the protocol.
• that many governments have
largely not protected artisanal and
small-scale fishers against  the
social and economic impacts of
globalization, that is,  increased
marginalization and poverty. 
• the absence of equitable and
sustainable access to inland and
marine aquatic resources in certain
countries.
• the cumbersome and bureaucratic
licensing procedures in South
Africa and Namibia, in particular.
• the lack of involvement and
participation of the small-scale
fisher community in the policy
formulation and related
decision-making processes in
certain SADC countries. 
• the lack of access to credit facilities,
infrastructure and subsidies on
fishing inputs.
• the continued marginalization and
unfair treatment of women in all
sectors of the fisheries.
• the absence of health, safety and
fair labour practices.
• the absence of concrete steps to put
in place measures regarding
shared aquatic resources in certain
SADC countries.  
We call on our SADC governments:
• to urgently take responsibility to
secure the following rights for
small-scale fishers:
˚ equitable and fair access to living
aquatic and fishing resources
˚ social security measures for
small-scale fishers
˚ food security for small-scale
fishers
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˚ active participation in policy
formulation and related
decision-making processes
• to recognize, respect and ensure
dignity of traditional and artisanal
fishers.
• to incorporate indigenous
knowledge systems of small-scale
fishers into resource management
processes.
We further call on our SADC
governments:
• to assist in empowering and
building the capacity of
small-scale fishers through:  
˚ regional exchange visits and
networking
˚ promotion of micro-financing
enterprises
• to safeguard the livelihoods of
artisanal fishers against the social
and economic impacts of
globalization.
• to ensure harmonzation of law and
regulations, and the fair
distribution of resources in
respective countries.
• to take concrete and practical steps
to involve the traditional and
artisanal fishers in the
management of aquatic resources
and ensure fair distribution of
costs and benefits among
beneficiaries.
• to ensure that the forthcoming
NEPAD fisheries conference takes
cognizance of this declaration and
makes provision for the
participation of fisher
representatives in the NEPAD
process.
This conference resolves:
That, considering that fishing
communities are particularly vulnerable
areas for HIV/AIDS transmission,
governments and civil society
organizations should take a leading role in
the following areas:
• provision of health facilities
• supply of anti-retroviral drugs
• awareness and educational
campaigns
• provide infrastructure support to
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This conference further resolves:
• to maintain this network of
small-scale fishers within the SADC
region on an ongoing basis.  
• to request Masifundise, together
with Coastal Links, to play an
interim secretariat role for this
network.
• to undertake the following
activities in our respective
countries: 
˚ disseminate and share
information (with the support of
WWF, Masifundise, PLAAS and
ICSF)
˚ engage with the ILO process
towards developing new labour
standards for the fishing sector,
with a view to reaching a greater
portion of the world’s fishers,
particularly small-scale and
artisanal fishers
˚ raise awareness of the NEPAD
fisheries process and advocate
for the full participation of fisher
representatives in this process
˚ advocate and lobby for
programmes to improve the
plight of small-scale fishers
˚ mobilize and organize
small-scale fisher groups and
networks in all our countries
˚ constructively collaborate with
respective governments in terms
of the implementation of the
protocol









This declaration was adopted on
5 November 2004  at the Southern
African Small-scale Fishers’
Conference at Cape Town


















Mr Yabaki said this
incentive would be



















Vanua Levu, as well
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Levuka and Kadavu,
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are to be trained in
fish farming,
according to a recent
Cabinet decision.
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and Okavango
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with marine life they
have become hugely
popular with divers. 
Yet experts say the
country reels in just
10 per cent of its
potential catch.
The abundance of
fish has also not
provided a defence
against hunger. An
estimated 20 per cent
of all children under




paper blames lack of
support, equipment,
and illiteracy on the
poor state of the
fishing industry, that
with investment,
experts say, could be
worth 4,000 jobs and
an annual $10 mn in
much-needed foreign
exchange.
In its fisheries code
issued in September
2002, the government
gave full rights to
small-scale fishermen
and banned the use
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and Peru for EU
fishing licences in
Peruvian waters.










his party will support
EU negotiations for a
fishing agreement
with Peru, granting
fishing licences to the
EU fleet targeting





















































be the transfer of
Peru’s tuna fishing
licences, which are
not being used at this
time.
SAMUDRA News Alerts launch 
The International Collective in Support of Fishworkers (ICSF)will officially launch its SAMUDRA News Alerts service inJanuary 2005. The service, which has been in the beta (test)
phase for almost a year now, is designed to deliver news on
fisheries and related issues, on a daily or weekly digest basis, in
plain-text or HTML format. 
Apart from news and stories on fisheries, the service also focuses
on environmental and oceans topics as well as issues that deal with
women in fisheries and safety at sea. So far, around 1,700 alerts
have been mailed out. Apart from news from secondary sources
like newspapers, agencies, mailing lists and websites, the service
has also featured SAMUDRA Exclusives, original stories from ICSF
sources. 
The alerts sent out daily (except on Saturday and Sunday) provide
headlines, a summary of news and links to the original sources. The
weekly news digest, sent on Saturdays, provides only headlines
and  links to the original sources. The news archives can be
searched on  the ICSF website by keywords, themes and country
names.
The SAMUDRA News Alerts service has so far  attracted close to 400
subscribers in different parts of the world. The users include
academics, journalists, policymakers, inter-governmental
organizations, researchers, students, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and fishworker organizations.  
Please visit http://www.icsf.net to subscribe to the news alerts.
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 “In towns where the fishing community had to share space
with society, all too often the fisher town became an area
of that town in itself, a separate quarter, usually at one
end, where the councils found they were able to push the
fishers, boats, gear and all. And so the fishing communities
grew from their own blood, marriages between fisher
families being the norm, although sometimes they mixed
with other fishers from along the coast. They became apart
from the rest of us, their lives wholly dependent on the sea
and the shoals they sought in earnest, working by night,
sleeping by day.”
— From Herring: A History of the Silver Darlings 
by Mike Smylie
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